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ABSTRACT 
 Traditional fleet operations and technologies are not adequately suited to counter 
the growing threat to undersea infrastructure from autonomous undersea systems. A 
cost-effective unmanned and manned system of systems is required to provide defense of 
this seabed infrastructure. This paper proposes possible system architectures to defend 
against this emerging threat to include passive barriers and active defense systems. The 
effectiveness of those candidate systems is evaluated through multiple agent-based 
modeling simulations of UUV versus UUV engagements. Analysis resulted in two major 
findings. First, point defense of critical assets is more effective than barrier defense. 
Second, system design must focus on minimizing the time required to effectively engage 
and neutralize threats, either through improvement to defensive UUV speed or 
investment in more UUV docking stations and sensor arrays. Cost analysis suggests that 
acquisition and operations cost of the recommended defensive system is less than the 
projected financial impact of a successful attack. 
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This study investigates effective ways to defend against attacks on undersea 
infrastructure using primarily active defense measures. The analysis takes place through 
two case studies; the defense of underwater infrastructure in the Natuna Besar natural gas 
fields in the South China Sea, and the defense of oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The research team built a series of models that were used to analyze the impact of 
alternative undersea infrastructure defense systems. A cost analysis team researched 
existing systems to determine a reasonable and credible cost estimation for the proposed 
systems and used current industry estimates to determine the complete cost impact should 
a successful attack occur on the undersea infrastructure. 
Undersea infrastructure defense comprises two primary functions: sensing the 
threat, and responding to it—with assets assigned to perform one or both functions. In the 
most basic concept, this consists of an array of acoustic buoys as sensors, and a flotilla of 
response unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Some of our larger models utilize 
supporting air assets and surface vessels to augment the sense and response functions at 
different levels of threat; in smaller models, only UUVs (with comparable sensor 
capabilities) are involved. 
Effective positioning and layering of assets enable undersea infrastructure defense. 
These techniques employ distinct schemes: area defense, point defense, or barrier defense 
(or some combination of the three). Each defensive scheme has a particular objective. Point 
defense attempts to protect a singular asset or position from an expected threat. Barrier 
defense is an attempt to maintain some sort of security perimeter to ensure that any asset 
or position within the barrier is better protected to a significant degree than assets or 
positions beyond the protect region. Area defense shares with barrier defense the same goal 
of improving the security of a designated region; however defending assets are not 
physically confined to specific barriers paths, and instead patrol the entire region. Figure 1 
provides an aid for conceptualization. 
xxii 
 
Figure 1. Visualization of defensive schemes 
 
 
B.  ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The project team developed four models to identify the alterations to operational 
concepts and system employment that impact the effectiveness of undersea infrastructure 
defense systems. These range from small scale models examining the tactical defense of 
underwater infrastructure in the Natuna Besar region against UUVs to a large-scale model 
examining theater-wide defense of the Gulf of Mexico against a wide range of threats. 
 
 1. Natuna Besar Models 
 
The Natuna Besar models investigate the effectiveness of defending key 
infrastructure nodes (for example, single oil platforms) and the pipelines that connect them. 
Natuna Besar Model 1 focused on the point defense of critical infrastructure nodes 
from enemy UUV attacks. This model employs defensive UUVs that perform both the 
sensing and responding functions; there are no additional sensors in this model. The 
defensive UUVs are either static or patrolling and are assumed to have the same sensor 
capabilities and limitations as a stand-alone sensor buoy, thereby negating the need for a 
pre-existing or temporary array of sensors. The intent is to investigate the idea of whether 
an architecture of inexpensive, easily deployable UUVs with a long shelf-life can 
xxiii 
effectively provide point defense of key infrastructure nodes against UUV threats. By 
reducing the types of assets, this model explored the idea of a minimally-manned, cost-
effective defense that can be applied in almost any scenario or region, and can be 
implemented by any entity.  
Natuna Besar Model 2 investigates the defense of the long stretches of pipeline that 
connect the critical extraction nodes to the shore. It does so by looking at how combinations 
of static and patrolling UUVs and static underwater sensors can be employed in a barrier 
parallel to the defended asset to defend against threat UUVs. The lessons learned about 
defending the 4 km stretch can then be scaled up and applied relative to the overall length 
of the pipeline. While the anticipated threat is the same as Natuna Besar Model 1, the 
incorporation of sensor arrays increases the available engagement window. 
 
2. Gulf of Mexico Models 
The Gulf of Mexico groups explored the defense of a large region. The two primary 
threats considered in this region were the destruction of a large number of infrastructure 
nodes disrupting industry in the region, or an attack on one of the critically vulnerable 
nodes causing catastrophic damage, similar to the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010. Either 
would have economic effects that could reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars. The 
models address these concerns by trying to determine what types of defensive 
arrangements could successfully defeat such attacks.  
Gulf of Mexico Model 1 sought to answer the question of how well a barrier of 
UUV and sensors provide a perimeter defense to keep underwater enemy UUVs from 
transiting submerged into the target rich environment of the Gulf of Mexico. The design is 
based on equally spaced sensor buoys, with Defender UUVs in docking stations poised to 
attack upon detection of enemy UUVs. 
Gulf of Mexico Model 2 examined the effectiveness of such a barrier when scaled 
up to a theater-wide defensive scheme against a wider range of threats, not just the long 
range LDUUV threat posited by Gulf of Mexico Model 1. The new threats are neutral 
flagged enemy cargo ships that are capable of sailing over the barrier undetected and either 
dropping off small diameter UUVs (SDUUV) in close proximity to their targets or acting 
xxiv 
as “Bomber Ships” themselves, dropping depth charges or even dragging their anchors to 
deal damage. In order to combat these additional threats, this model utilizes a defense in 
depth approach combining point, barrier, and area defense assets including ships, aircraft, 
UUV from underwater docking stations, and underwater sensor networks.  
 
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The team utilized an agent based simulation, Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA), to conduct analysis. MANA uses configurable agents that simulate attackers, 
defenders, and pipeline or platform targets. Figure 2 presents an example graphic from a 
MANA program. 
 
Figure 2. Gulf of Mexico MANA Simulation 
 
The team utilized space filling Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
designs to define simulation runs to explore the full design space. Regression analysis of 
data output provided insight into the performance of different defense systems across 





Implementing an active defensive system responsible for protecting underwater 
infrastructure defense of the Natuna Besar or Gulf of Mexico regions is a proposition of 
breathtaking proportions. It will require significant amounts of capital for both the initial 
design of and deployment of the defensive systems in the short term and for the 
administration, maintenance, and eventual replacement of those systems over the ensuing 
decades. Before pushing ahead with any such projects in a piecemeal fashion, high-level 
decision makers should take several factors into consideration 
A simple point defense of critical assets must be included in a defensive scheme 
whenever possible. Barrier Defenses composed of roving or stationary patrols are 
insufficient, even in conjunction with area defense assets that can supplement them. So far 
as the design factors surrounding defensive weaponry itself are concerned, the number of 
weapons and their accuracy has been found to be more important than any other factor, 
including sensor range, weapon range, and weapon lethality to name a few.  
For a barrier defense of a pipeline it also holds true that a large number of UUVs in 
fixed docking stations is better than roving patrols. This system performs best when 
continuous targeting updates are provided to the UUVs from a fixed sensor array. The 
wider the sensor array, the better because this provides the defending UUVs with more 
time to engage the threat. One option to increase the width of the array would be make the 
array two or preferably three rows deep. 
The proposed system of sensor arrays and UUVs is not intended to replace all 
traditional maritime and coastal defenses. The defense of undersea infrastructure has the 
highest success rate when existing surface and air assets are able to receive information 
from the sensor array and provide additional firepower to the defending UUVs.  
To place a minimal barrier of just UUVs in the Gulf of Mexico will cost $1.5 billion.  
Adding an integrated sensor array network and point defense for 100 critical infrastructure 
nodes brings the total cost to $6.2 billion, excluding the operational and maintenance cost 
for the surface ships and patrol aircrafts. This system is cost effective compared to the 
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estimated $62 billion that was lost in revenue and damages during the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill. 
For Natuna Besar, acquisition of a barrier that covers the entire pipeline is estimated 
to cost $1.9 billion and an additional $66 million for point defense of each platform. With 
152 platforms, defense of the entire undersea infrastructure in Natuna Besar, we estimate 
an initial cost of  $10 billion.  
While there is substantial appeal in investing in active defenses such as those 
investigated in this paper due to the optimism generally associated with new technologies 
and the potential applications they may have towards unforeseen uses, equal attention 
should be paid towards passive defensive measures, resilient and redundant systems, and 
repair and recovery capabilities. Additionally, if active defenses are developed and 
deployed, it is critical that a thorough systems engineering process guides that effort. Such 
process is necessary to avoid cost overruns, incompatible systems, and substandard 
performance due to the enormous number of shareholders, technical challenges, evolving 
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Of all the challenges facing 21st century defense and security planners, the defense 
of underwater infrastructure is one of the most difficult to solve (Barker, 2018). The 
opportunities, capabilities and hostile intentions that might lead to the exploitation of 
undersea infrastructure around the world have existed for as long as that infrastructure has 
been in place. With few exceptions however, for most of modern history they have either 
not resided together in one adversary or, when they have, whatever benefits were to be had 
by such actions were far outweighed by the associated costs and risks. With so few recorded 
instances of attacks against underwater infrastructure there has been a correspondingly low 
amount of preparation for its defense (Kashubsky, 2011; Glenney, 2019). Indeed, in the 
past it has generally been assumed that strong conventional surface and subsurface forces 
from national Coast Guards and Navies were sufficient for the defense of national interests, 
particularly the underwater infrastructure in littoral waters and economic exclusion zones.  
As the global environment has evolved economically, technologically, and 
politically over the past decades, the defense and security communities have become 
increasingly aware that the cost/risk/reward factor associated with exploiting underwater 
infrastructure has been continually shifting in favor of the would-be attacker (Glenney, 
2019). In particular, the changing environment has drastically increased the number of 
opportunities for exploitation around the world, lowered the cost of acquiring necessary 
capabilities for various types of exploitation, and increased the number of possible 
motivations for hostile intent. 
This study investigates effective ways to defend against attacks on undersea 
infrastructure. The analysis takes place through two case studies; the defense of underwater 
infrastructure in the Natuna Besar natural gas fields in the South China Sea, and the defense 
of oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
Opportunity, capability, and intent are useful standards for examining the danger 
posed by a possible threat. This section will provide a background understanding of 
opportunity, capability, and intent in the context of the exploitation of undersea 
infrastructure defense.  
1. Opportunity 
Opportunity is represented by the wide variety of vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited by potential adversaries. For defense and commercial purposes, these 
vulnerabilities fall into three main categories; fossil fuel extraction and transfer, electrical 
power transfer, and communications information transfer (Wrathall, 2010). The increases 
in opportunity for exploiting underwater infrastructure can be attributed to two main 
causes; increased numbers of targets and increasingly critical vulnerabilities. For example, 
between 1988 and 2013 an average of over 31,000 miles of submarine cable was laid per 
year, totaling over 750,000 miles. These cables form the backbone of the digital age 
infrastructure, collectively carrying over 99% of all internationally transmitted data (Main, 
2015). Offshore oil and gas production is also on the rise. In the Gulf of Mexico alone, 
offshore oil production has risen from under 300 billion barrels per year in 1990 to over 
600 billion barrels per year in 2017 (Zeringue, 2017). These increases have been the result 
of increasing investment in offshore and especially deep-water extraction technology, the 
proliferation of which has helped expand oil and gas production globally (Manning, 2016). 
Cumulatively, communications and energy infrastructure projects around the world have 
had the effect of ensuring that underwater infrastructure targets are available and plentiful 
in virtually every region of the world. 
Beyond the mere proliferation in number of targets, the nature of the targets 
themselves has led to the formation of increasingly critical vulnerabilities. Whereas several 
decades past a major attack on underwater infrastructure would have had a fairly small 
impact on the global community, today the stakes are far higher. Increased reliance on the 
undersea infrastructure used for communication has created an opportunity for attackers to 
disrupt banking and impact national economies. Concentrated routing of communication 
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cables creates chokepoints that if severed would result in wide area outages. Targeting data 
for these cables and oil/natural gas pipelines are readily available in the public domain 
making both systems easy to target. Additionally, security responsibility gaps complicate 
agencies’ ability to coordinate defense (Wrathall, 2010). Given the complexity of the issue, 
the opportunity for an adversary to strike is real and would cause severe damage to our 
underwater infrastructure with compounding economic and environmental consequences.  
2. Capability 
Capability is represented by the various assortment of tools that could be used to 
conduct an exploit. They range from the simple kinetic weapons such as commercial ships 
intentionally dragging their anchors across seabed infrastructure to high tech weaponry that 
has been purpose built for any number of undersea missions (Dean, 2017). 
New capabilities have come about in the form of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
(UUVs). These systems are smaller, cheaper and quieter than manned submersibles and in 
many cases entirely expendable. The decreasing costs of acquiring and operating them 
means that more adversaries will have them, and will likely be able to employ them in large 
numbers. Increased levels of global commerce and shipping both in size and quantity 
creates higher levels of ambient noise. This makes an already quiet UUV increasingly 
harder to detect.  
The increased number of ships also means an increased danger from the ships 
themselves. More shipping means more ships to keep track of, an increased likelihood that 
one may have hostile intentions, and an increased lethality from larger ships. This makes 
threat detection, identification, evaluation, and response a substantially more difficult 
problem for any surface vessel defense force. 
In the realm of underwater threats, the capability to conduct stealthy and effective 
seabed warfare operations has existed for decades. For example, declassified Cold War 
operations like Operation Ivy Bells when the NSA and CIA tapped Soviet undersea cables, 
demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of underwater assets in exploiting underwater 
infrastructure (Gaskill, 2018). While the cost of special mission submarines such as the one 
used in operation Ivy Bells is still immense, the revolution in autonomous vehicles has 
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begun to make available some similar capabilities at a much lower price and to a much 
broader audience (Dean, 2017). This broader audience includes potential adversaries, but 
it also includes commercial and scientific endeavors, thereby complicating the already 
challenging targeting problems of undersea warfare even further.  
3. Intent 
Hostile intent, in both the surface and subsurface threat categories, is made 
especially difficult to identify as a result of the aforementioned proliferation of threat 
capability to new audiences. These motivated adversaries could come from a wide range 
of sources, including both nation states and non-state actors which range from private 
companies to international terrorist organizations. Given that they could be motivated by 
wildly different objectives, the ways in which adversaries would attempt to exploit 
underwater infrastructure investments is worth particular exploration. The following 
examples illustrate the broad nature of these motivations. Understanding the motives leads 
to defensive schemes that can be developed and analyzed. 
One motive for attack is to drive up costs for the owners of the industry in question. 
This type of exploitation has the capacity to cause far greater harm than merely the amount 
of damage done to the infrastructure itself. For example, in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
in 2010 the British Petroleum company lost operation of its oil well which was valued at 
approximately $560 million (Staff, 2010). The loss of this asset alone would be a 
significant but ultimately minor setback for a company with over $280 billion in assets and 
a net operating income of $9.5 billion annually. Taking into consideration the 
environmental costs, however, and the damage balloons to over $65 billion (Bousso, 2018). 
While there is no suggestion that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a malicious act, the 
costs associated with stopping and cleaning it indicate that a future attack designed to inflict 
similar financial damages to a company is certainly within the realm of possibility. 
Another motive could be to deny access to those resources so as to stop their 
utilization. For example, if a community relies on offshore natural gas to power its 
industrial manufacturing, denying access to that gas will decrease or eliminate the 
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manufacturing capability until it can be restored. Amplified to its natural extreme, this 
approach could be used to deny critical energy resources to an entire nation in times of war.  
A third possible motive is to raise the cost of resources on the global market by 
decreasing the amount of global supply. This can be achieved by physically impeding their 
delivery, or by raising the cost of doing business (building, operating, maintaining, etc.) to 
prohibitive and uncompetitive levels. For example, when the Deepwater Horizon spill 
occurred, there was substantial speculation that increasing taxes, regulations, and insurance 
costs would be implemented that would drive up the cost of doing business in U.S. waters. 
Such measures could have drastic effects of increasing the costs of energy in the short and 
the long term, and there would be big winners and big losers as a result. In particular, the 
big winners would be the individuals, companies, and nations able to profit from the ability 
to produce oil at lower costs and cash in on the higher rate of return.  
A fourth motive might be the theft of some of those resources. This is really only 
feasible on the information communication side, wherein an actor could potentially tap into 
underwater communications cables to intercept data transmissions. This approach has been 
utilized in the past, but the nature of digital communications and the widespread utilization 
of encrypted message traffic suggests that it would be of substantially reduced value today. 
A fifth possible motive is the use of an attack to send a message, possibly as a way 
to coerce some other actor into some decision they would otherwise have avoided. This 
could include anything ranging from an environmental terrorist organization aiming to pin 
the blame of an environmental disaster on an industry so as to push for stronger long-term 
regulation all the way to a nation state signaling that certain actions on the international 
stage would not be tolerated. 
Without precise foreknowledge of which potential adversaries will become real 
hostile actors, and without the ability to thoroughly investigate means, motives, and 
opportunities for every particular threat in advance, it is nearly impossible for any universal 
defensive scheme to be developed and optimized to employ a perfect defense with existing 
or even future technologies that can be anticipated within the short term. Rather, undersea 
infrastructure defense is best approached with the goal of meeting the most significant 
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threats with as high a degree of defense possible given cost related constraints. This 
suggests that the problem is well suited to a systems engineering approach, which would 
help ensure that stakeholder requirements are well understood and the system architecture 
employed takes into consideration a thorough assessment of critical measures of analysis 
and measures of performance required to provide the requisite multi-faceted defense.  
C. TASKING STATEMENT AND PROJECT SCOPING 
Recognizing the complexity associated with developing a multi-faceted defense for 
global undersea infrastructure, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Chair of Systems 
Engineering Analysis developed the following tasking statement as a way of scoping and 
bounding the undersea infrastructure defense problem:  
Design a cost effective, deployable and resilient unmanned and manned 
system of systems employed to provide seabed infrastructure defense in the 
2030–2035 timeframe. Consider employment requirements, power 
requirements, operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, interoperability, 
sensor data processing, transfer and accessibility, logistics, forward arming 
and refueling (FARPS) basing support in forward areas or from CONUS 
bases. Where possible, include joint contributions in the systems of systems. 
Develop alternative architectures that include defensive systems, sensors, 
manning, communication and network connectivity, and their operational 
employment concepts. Investigate current commercially off the shelf 
technologies for rapid acquisition. Use two regional undersea infrastructure 
systems to analyze the cost- effectiveness of the alternatives: the Gulf of 
Mexico oil and communication system and the Natuna Gas Field (Greater 
Sarawak Basin) feeding into Singapore.   
Based on the discussion of opportunities, capabilities, and intent presented 
previously, the team identified key areas of emphasis within the tasking statement in order 
to determine what to address given the allotted time and resources. The first part of the 
tasking statement, the design of a system of systems that considers a large number of 
factors, was particularly challenging given that the project timeline precluded the 
development and testing of any physical instantiations of undersea infrastructure defense 
systems. 
In order to overcome this hurdle, the team decided to build a series of models which 
could be used to analyze the impact of alternative undersea infrastructure defense systems. 
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The selection of the models built was made through consideration of the second key point 
of the tasking statement, the creation of alternative architectures that could guide the 
development and employment of the defensive schemes utilized. Both the computer 
models and their guiding architectures were developed with consideration towards the third 
major aspect of the tasking statement, undersea infrastructure defense of both Natuna Besar 
and the Gulf of Mexico. A cost analysis team researched existing systems to determine a 
reasonable and credible cost estimation for the proposed systems and used current industry 
estimates to determine the complete cost impact should a successful attack occur on the 
undersea infrastructure. 
D. PROJECT TEAM 
The team assigned to perform this task was Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 
28 (SEA 28), comprised of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students with a diverse range 
of specialties, programs, and nationalities. Team members have backgrounds in aviation, 
surface warfare, subsurface warfare, armor infantry, engineering, logistics, human 
resources and air defense. The team includes military officers from the United States Navy, 
Marine Corps, Israeli Defense Force and Singaporean Army and Air Force. To emphasize 
the interdisciplinary expertise of the project team, a list of the members and their 
backgrounds is presented in Table 1. 
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II. INITIAL RESEARCH 
In order to develop systems to operate in and defend the regions of the Gulf of 
Mexico and Natuna Besar the team needed to understand what those areas looked like.  
What followed was research into the physical layout such as climate, water depth, bottom 
composition and what made up the underwater infrastructure. The geopolitical layout of 
the two regions are very different and play a crucial role in understanding how to defend 
the undersea infrastructure. 
The following sections will outline key information that was used to build the 
models starting with a review of previous work on infrastructure defense. The next section 
is on the Gulf of Mexico’s environment and infrastructure followed by the same for Natuna 
Besar as well as a discussion of the complex geopolitical issues specific to that region. The 
final section of this chapter covers the potential threats and new technology that could 
become readily available to an adversary or used for defense of undersea infrastructure. 
A. SE PROCESS: RESEARCH APPROACH 
Due to the need to examine alternative systems for undersea infrastructure defense 
in multiple operational environments SEA28 developed a tailored research approach. The 
team executed an analysis methodology as presented by (MacCalman, 2016) focused on 
identification of desirable systems and operational tactics to support undersea 
infrastructure defense. Given that the approach suggested development of multiple 
simulation models, the team split up into groups in order to research the infrastructure in 
the two different regions. This included information about the existing pipelines, 
communication cables, applicable regulations regarding both and the systems in place if 
any that are used to defend them. From there we began to explore probable technology and 
methods that a State or Non-State actor could use to subvert those systems and attack the 
pipeline or cable infrastructure. We used that information to generate threat scenarios and 
functional and physical system architectures to counter those threats. 
The architectures that our teams developed included active and passive defensive 
systems, sensors, networked communication and command and control. In accordance with 
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our tasking statement, we investigated current commercially off-the-shelf technologies for 
rapid acquisition taking into consideration employment requirements, power requirements, 
operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, interoperability, sensor data processing, 
transfer and accessibility, logistics, forward arming and refueling (FARPS) basing support 
in forward areas or from CONUS bases. 
The following chapter will cover the pertinent information about the two distinct 
undersea regions that we focused on as well as a description of the potential threats and the 
current range of capabilities. From there the rest of this report will cover the methods used 
to model threats and defensive systems, the design of experiments to use on those models 
and an analysis of the results. Our solution is not a detailed design of a specific workable 
defense system. Instead the objective of this research is to arrive at an analysis of what 
factors in system development provide the greatest return on investment, and which 
concepts of operation will increase the probability of success against an agile foe.  
B. INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE 
National and global events like the terrorist attacks on 9/11, hurricane Katrina, and 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster highlight the importance of protecting the infrastructure 
that societies have come to rely on. Accordingly, there is an extensive body of work on 
various aspects of infrastructure defense ranging from prediction tools to protection 
methods.  
Organizations like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) have 
created processes like Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 
(RAMCAPSM) to identify and prioritize infrastructure in order to better protect against 
damage from these events and improve the ability to return to full function (ASME 
Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC, 2009). Predicting the attacks from a motivated, 
intelligent network of terrorists seems nearly impossible, but several papers from the 
Operations Research department of the Naval Postgraduate School outline reasonable ways 
to make such predictions and some of the potential risks from using probabilistic methods 
(Brown, 2011). Additional work from the same department shows how to optimize defense 
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(Brown, 2008) and analyze how vulnerable infrastructure systems are to attack (Brown, 
2005). 
Whether the system in question is an electric grid, bridge or nuclear power plant, 
infrastructure that has been designed for public use and serves a critical need is not only an 
attractive target to attack but also highly vulnerable. While improvements have been made 
with these threats in mind incorporating defensive principles like redundancy, security and 
shielding there is always the potential for an adversary to find a way to attack. An active 
pursuit of ways to defend against new threats is critical to the continued operation of the 
systems we have come to rely on. As we continue to expand infrastructure on the seabed it 
is just as important to develop new technology needed to defend this growing frontier. The 
complex environment of the undersea world can look very different depending where you 
are in the world and the Gulf of Mexico accordingly is quite different from the waters of 
Natuna Besar.  
C. NATUNA BESAR 
1. Environment 
a. Natural Environment 
The physical location for the Natuna Gas Fields is an area of the South China Sea 
called the “Greater Sarawak Basin,” which is approximately one thousand miles north of 
Jakarta, Indonesia and 140 miles northeast of the Riau Islands. There are multiple gas fields 
in the region (Figure 1) that are welled and currently supplying natural gas in the area 
surrounding the waters North of the Riau Island Chain are Anoa, Naga, Gajah Baru, Natuna 
Sea Block A, Natuna Sea Block B, Kakap South, and Kakap North (Natuna Gas Field - 
Greater Sarawak Basin, 2018). These various gas fields can be seen in Figure 2. To 
maintain consistency of terminology, our team primarily used this reference in researching 




 Pipeline Connections. Source: Gas Exports (2010).  
 
 Natuna Besar Region and Pipeline. Source: Natuna Gas 
Field – Greater Sarawak Basin and Google. 
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The water depth around the pipeline is between 70 and 100 meters with a few 
deeper exceptions, as illustrated in Figure 3. The depth of the water played some part in 
determining the level of threat to the undersea infrastructure and then in selecting the 
possible locations of attack along the pipeline. Different methods of attack were determined 
depending on the depth of the sea above the pipes. This helped the team determine the most 
dangerous and most probable courses of action for a possible enemy in the region and 
produced some interesting discussions on emerging technology capabilities. Distance 
between the countries in the region helped shape the team’s build of a likely scenario and 
also spurred discussion of the geopolitics in the region. After reviewing this information, 
an area surrounding the grid box MGRS 48N WH 2695 8658 was selected as a likely 
location of attack (Figure 4).  
 
 Sea Depth. 
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 Likely location of attack. Source: Earthpoint. 
b. Political Environment: Competing Powers in the Natuna Besar Region 
Natuna Besar is centrally located between several countries with interest in the 
region. As seen in Figure 5, Indonesia and Malaysia play a major role in territorial control 
and defense of the areas around the gas fields. Both Malaysia and Indonesia possess large 
militaries with modern Army, Navy, and Air Force components. Indonesia has the most 
significant military presence in the area, with ground forces occupying military bases and 
anti-aircraft artillery positions on Natuna Besar Island itself.  
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 Regional Countries and Technology Companies 
Singapore shares interest in the area, as it is an international cargo and petroleum 
shipping hub. According to the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore, over 130,000 ships 
pass through the port in Singapore per year (MPA, 2019). Although Singapore does not 
produce any of its own oil, it is the top bunkering (ship refueling) site in the world (MPA, 
2019). The infrastructure and business processes to manage and efficiently move ships has 
made Singapore one of the busiest ports in the world, with a ship arriving or departing 
every 2–3 minutes (MPA, 2019). 
Singapore has had a long fight from its initial declaration of independence in 1965 
and it continues to fight for relevancy and self-sustainment. Surrounded by countries 
dwarfed by the small city-state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) earnings, tensions are 
high between nations in the region. Deteriorating relations and disputes over borders have 
created a natural progression of saber-rattling and enhancement of defenses in the region. 
2. Infrastructure 
a. Natuna Besar Natural Gas Access History 
There are several articles that discuss how the region has passed back and forth 
from national to commercial entity over the past 40 years (MSTAR, 2013; ABC Aus, 
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2017). A large pool of investors over decades created potential stakeholders in the region 
who have influence over decisions made on infrastructure, defense, and future investment. 
Understanding the fractured history is important for understanding the greater context of 
why this region is in danger of conflict. As the process of fracking natural gas becomes 
more cost-effective, many nations have started to stake claims to their own plots of sea and 
well-heads. In turn, Indonesia has been required to answer with military force in the region 
and continues to bolster is defenses on the Riau Island chain at large. 
Around the year 1980, a split venture between Pertamina (Indonesia’s state-owned 
petroleum company) and Exxon Mobil Corporation of the United States of America, was 
initiated in Natuna Sea Block A and the East Natuna region. Although there was significant 
capital invested, the research did not result in production. Environmental conditions made 
extraction of the natural gas difficult, especially during this timeframe when off-shore 
drilling technology was still under development (Gas Exports, 2010). For the next 15 years, 
little was done in the area due to political disruption, and its remote location. Nonetheless, 
Exxon continued exploration and invested almost $400 million (combined with 
Pertamina’s $60 million investments), before the Indonesian Government terminated its 
contract with Exxon in 2007 leaving Pertamina in charge (Natuna Gas Field - Greater 
Sarawak Basin, 2018).  
Starting in 2001, the various companies working in the region began developing 
the Belanak field in West Natuna, intending to export natural gas to Malaysia through a 22 
inch submarine pipeline from producing fields to the Belida/Belanch tie-in, with a 
subsequent 28 inch line to Singapore. (Natuna Gas Field - Greater Sarawak Basin, 2018). 
This is significant for current (2019) and future development of this region and provides 
more context for expansion of the gas production capability of the Natuna Besar region. 
This system of pipelines will be the focus of our analysis in the Natuna Besar region.  
b. Other Infrastructure in the Region 
The Natuna Besar teams were tasked with creating a scenario which determined 
what undersea infrastructure was to be protected in the region. Working together, a 
streamlined “road to war” was created, setting the stage for two competing powers to enter 
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into aggression against each other. Part of creating the scenario was choosing a target for 
attack. While researching local possible undersea infrastructure targets, the team found a 
large amount of undersea internet cabling (Figure 6) connecting the world’s data network 
infrastructure. These networks of cabling had major hubs located in Singapore and 
Malaysia and directly connected these economies to other Asian Countries and the United 
States of America (Kuzian, 2015). Upon further research, it was found that multiple 
redundancies and back-ups made targeting the cables unlikely. Various scenarios were 
“war-gamed” and in the end it was decided that the most likely and most dangerous attack 
would likely come against the undersea pipeline networks connecting the gas fields to 
locations such as Singapore. However, it is important to note that these cable networks 
exist and are potentially vulnerable to a similar style attack as discussed in this report. 
 
 Communication Cables. 
3. Current Defenses 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia all currently have some limited air, surface, 
and subsurface defensive capability in vicinity of the Natuna Besar Gas and Oil fields. For 
example, Indonesia has land and sea-based anti-aircraft defenses in place on Natuna Besar 
Island, its air force operates Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MARPAT), and it has a sizeable 
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naval force that includes surface ships, submarines, and minesweepers.   Figure 7 depicts 
land-based anti-aircraft defenses installed aboard Natuna Besar Island (MAREX, 2019) 
and their ship-board anti-submarine defenses on the KRI Imam Bonjol (Soeriaatmadja, 
2019). These capabilities are shared to varying degrees by the Singaporean and Malaysian 
militaries, with the exception that Singapore currently lacks long range MARPAT. There 
is currently no agreed upon regional strategy or cooperation agreement for mutual defense 
of undersea infrastructure. As China builds its influence in the region, it will also 
financially and militarily support partner nations in the region. This will likely tip balances 
of power and further strain tensions between nations in the region. 
 
 Indonesian Military Weapons. Source: MAREX (2019) and 
Soeriaatmadja (2019). 
D. GULF OF MEXICO 
The Gulf of Mexico is a semi-closed basin located in North America measuring 
1600 km in length and up to 1300 km in width. It is bounded by the following nations: (1) 
United States from North East to North West consisting of Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana 
and Texas spanning 2700 km, (2) Mexico from the South West to South spanning 2805 
km, and (3) Cuba at the South East (See Figure 8). The size of the Gulf basin is around 1.6 




 Gulf of Mexico. Source: Gomez (2004). 
1. Environment 
a. Natural Environment 
 The Gulf of Mexico is characterized by warm and humid climates with rain year-
round. Temperatures ranges from 28–29C during summer and 19–20C during winter as 
the cold winds from the North resists the warm waters from the South East (Gomez, 2004).  
 A warm ocean current called the Loop Current dominates the surface currents in 
the Gulf of Mexico. It follows a clockwise loop with an average speed of 0.7 m/s  
(Figure 9) flowing northwards between the Yucatan Peninsula and Cuba into the Gulf 
before looping east and south, exiting through the Florida Straits (Love, 2013). 
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 Sea Surface Currents at Gulf of Mexico. Source: Love 
(2013). 
 The seabed at the center of Gulf of Mexico and along the southern U.S. coastline 
consists of mainly mud (see Figure 10). Other forms of sediments at the bottom ranges 
from fine particles to gravel and rocks (Love, 2013). These bottom sediments form the 
habitats for a range of organisms which are responsible for performing key eco-functions 
such as nutrient cycling and stabilization of sediments. 
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 Sediment Composition at Bottom Gulf of Mexico. Source: 
Love (2013). 
 The Gulf of Mexico is home to a diverse range of habitats, ranging from oyster 
reefs, salt marshes, corals and mangrove forests (Love, 2013). Invertebrates (like shrimps 
and crabs), fishes (like bull shark, red snapper and bluefin tuna), birds, turtles and marine 
mammals (like dolphins and manatees) all can be found in this region (Love, 2013). 
a. Political Environment 
The Gulf of Mexico is a major economic resource for the countries surrounding it, 
particularly with regards to offshore energy production, commercial shipping, commercial 
and sport fishing, and various types of tourism.  
2. Infrastructure 
Amidst this diverse environment, the Gulf of Mexico is one of the most important 
regions for energy resources for the United States via the production of oil and gas (Gulf 
of Mexico Fact Sheet, n.d.). Figure 11 highlights the distribution of oil and gas in the U.S. 
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portion of the Gulf, where we can find about ~3,200 active structures (NOAA Gulf of 
Mexico Data Atlas, n.d.) and 17,507 miles of active pipelines (Enforcement, n.d.) (see 
Figure 12). As of 2017, a total of 53,000 wells had been drilled in the Gulf, with 87% of 
them in water depth of less than 400 feet (Kaiser, 2018). Regulations require pipelines with 
diameters of greater than 8 5/8 inches that are installed in water depths less than 200 feet 
are to be buried to a depth of at least 3 feet below the mudline (Cranswick, 2001). In 
addition, if the authorities deem that the pipeline (regardless of size) constitutes a hazard 
to others, these pipelines must be buried as well. Within Federal waters, the pipeline must 
be buried to a depth of 10 feet below a fairway and 16 feet below an anchorage (Cranswick, 
2001).  
The Gulf of Mexico accounts for greater than 25% of the total U.S. domestic oil 
production and 7% of the total U.S. natural gas production. Furthermore, more than 30% 
of all the U.S. petroleum refining capacity and natural gas processing capacity (comprising 
of major players such as Shell, BP and Total) are located in the Gulf of Mexico (Love, 
2013) as shown in Figure 13, highlighting the importance of the region to the energy 
requirements of the U.S. The development of oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico 
is split into three main planning areas (Eastern, Central and Western), of which a total of 
2,505 leases covering 160 million acres are in use (BOEM, 2019). 
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 Oil and Gas Distribution at Gulf of Mexico. Source: Love 
(2013).  
 




 Oil and Gas Activities at Gulf of Mexico. Source: Love 
(2013).  
3. Current Defense 
The current defense of the Gulf of Mexico is centered upon the traditional air, land 
and sea domains with little emphasis on dedicated protection of the oil platforms and 
pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico. The homeland defense of the Gulf of Mexico currently 
falls under the ambit of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (U.S. Northern 
Command, n.d.). Forces under the USNORTHCOM includes the Air Forces Northern 
(headquartered in Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City) (U.S. Northern Command, n.d.). 
The 8th District Coast Guard is responsible for operations such as law enforcement and 
search and rescue in the Gulf of Mexico (United States Coast Guard Atlantic Area, n.d.). 
Furthermore, private security firms are only employed in areas whereby there is a higher 
threat due to militants, piracy or criminals like in the Gulf of Aden. Hence, protection of 
the oil platforms and pipelines are currently minimal in the Gulf of Mexico (Husband, 
2013). Recent emphasis has been placed by the Navy on under-sea surveillance through 
the sources-sought notice by the Office of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR) for maritime surveillance (Keller, 2014). 
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E. CONVENTIONAL THREATS TO UNDERWATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
As previously discussed, an adversary has the capability to harm underwater 
infrastructure using conventional technology such as bombs, dragging anchor on the 
seabed or using manned submarines. The following technologies and scenarios are not new 
threats but have existed for decades and are presented as examples of how vulnerable 
undersea infrastructure is to a highly motivated adversary. 
1. Bomb Dropping from Ship Scenario   
An enemy vessel (can be disguised as a commercial vessel) can sail along a pipeline 
and drop munitions (“carpet bombing”). It is relatively easy to get intelligence on the 
precise location of the pipelines and release bombs when directly above it, the bombs will 
start sinking due to gravity but they will also drift with the currents so the bombs will not 
move directly downwards and will hit the seabed with some miss distance from the 
pipeline. A sophisticated enemy can measure or estimate the currents speed and direction 
and adjust the releasing point accordingly to get the bomb seabed impact point as close as 
possible to the pipeline. The desired outcome is for the miss distance to be smaller than the 
bomb kill radius (the radius that the bomb will damage the pipeline). Although as simple 
calculations show (Appendix C) dropping even a single large diameter bomb (considering 
the average Gulf currents) over an oil pipe has a high probability of successfully damaging 
the pipe. 
2. Anchoring Scenario 
A large vessel can drop an anchor in a proximity to a pipeline and drag it over the 
pipe. Terrorist groups can hijack a larger container ship or tanker and use the anchor as a 
weapon to damage seabed infrastructure. The impact of the anchor hitting the pipe can 
damage the pipeline, even for a buried pipe if it is less than the depths shown in Table 2 
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Table 2 Required Pipeline Burial Depth 
Mass of anchor (kg) Impact energy (J) Effective burial depth (m) 
3060 36435 0.66 
4890 103557 1.18 
6900 208032 1.71 
1050 443709 2.54 
14100 717386 3.25 
20000 1211871 4.25 
Depth provides protection from deep water anchoring. Source: Yuan Zhuang (2016) 
 
3. Manned Submarine Attack  
An enemy submarine can launch a torpedo or come within close proximity of a 
pipeline and attach an explosive. 
In our work we decided not to focus on the conventional threats as existing systems 
(Keller, 2019) and previous works have already explored the scenarios such as 
Antisubmarine warfare (Broadmeadow, 2008; Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2004) and 
detection of abnormal behavior of vessels (Liraz, 2018; Morel, 2008). 
Also, these types of attacks require the enemy to send manned vessels or 
submarines to the pipeline area. These operations come with higher risk and higher acoustic 
signature compared to the emerging threats to be discussed in the next section. 
F. UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES 
UUVs have been around for many years but in recent years they have started to get 
a more important role in the undersea world, both for civilian use such as monitoring, 
repairing and laying undersea infrastructure and military use such as patrol and 
reconnaissance. 
1. Background 
A UUV is a device that operates in the underwater environment that is either 
remotely controlled via cables or preprogramed to perform specified tasks. The remote-
controlled version is commonly called an ROV (Remote Operated underwater Vehicle), 
and the preprogramed version is referred to as an AUV (Autonomous Underwater Vehicle). 
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Due to the nature of underwater communication limitations there are big advantages for an 
AUV versus an ROV configuration (Office of CNO, 2004). 
UUVs are generally comprised of a sensor in the front, a payload (such as 
explosives), an energy unit, usually in a form of a battery and an electrical engine and fins 
for steering (Chu, 2010). A basic configuration is show in Table 3. 
 
 Generic UUV Architecture. Source: Chu (2010) 
A different type of UUV known as gliders use wave energy for propulsion. As the 
waves move a tethered float up and down the glider uses wings to convert the vertical 
movement to horizontal movement. Gliders are very energy efficient and can travel great 
distances with long endurance. 
2. UUV Classes and Specifications 
The Navy’s 2004 UUV master plan (Office of CNO, 2004) divides UUVs into four 
categories (Button, 2009) as shown in Table 3, the UUV classes are divided by size and 
endurance.  
 










As the classes were assigned in 2004, recent developments in commercial UUVs 
(that can be used for military purposes) do not necessarily fits those classes. Examples 
include large Gliders and Biomimetic AUV and ROVs (Gassier 2007; Wood 2019; Davis, 
2002; Ahmad, 2015). 
For illustration purposes this paper will use the following size classifications in 
Table 4 that correspond approximately to the UUV classes previously mentioned.  
 







Different classes of UUVs were examined (see Appendix A) and minimum and 
maximum values for speed, endurance and payload weight were identified in Table 5. In 
the cases when payload weight was not available it was estimated at 20% of the total 
weight. 
 






Speed  1  10  kph 
Endurance  8  8000  Hour 
Payload weight  3  2000  Kg 
 
3. Torpedo Types and Specifications 
Torpedoes were in use a long time before the development of UUVs (Barber, 1874) 
but they can be treated as a special case of UUV with no return capability (“suicide 
mission”). Torpedoes vary in size, range, speed and propulsion systems. Propulsion can 
come from a piston engine using compressed air or steam such as the “Whitehead” torpedo 
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(Barber, 1874), an electric engine such as the French “F21” (DCNS, 2019), gas turbine 
such as the British “Spearhead” (Tovey, 2014) or a solid fuel rocket engine such as the 
Russian “Shkval” (Russia, 1995; Tyler, 2000). 
Different types of torpedoes were examined (see Appendix A) and the minimum 
and maximum values of the different characteristics are shown in Table 6. Not all torpedoes 
specifications had warhead weight data. From the data we had the warhead is about 15% 
of the total weight of the torpedo. “Shkval” and “Spearfish” torpedo were omitted due to 
their high cost and big size making them less likely to be relevant to our scenario. 
 






Speed  50  92  kph 
Range  10  50  Km 
Warhead weight  3  2000  Kg 
 
4. Underwater and UUV Detection 
Underwater detection of objects usually rely on acoustics as sound propagates in 
water with much less attenuation than electro-magnetic fields and can achieve much greater 
detection range (Sun, 2018). 
Acoustic underwater target detection systems are usually called “Sonar” (SOund 
NAvigation and Ranging). The sonar systems can be divided to active sonars that transmit 
sound wave and locate the target by receiving the echo wave reflected from the target, and 
passive sonars that have only a receiver that is used to pick up sound emitted by the target.  
Active sonars frequency ranges from 50Hz to above 600KHz. Higher frequencies 
will tend to have more attenuation but give a better range resolution. For better angle 
resolution some sonars use an array of sensors and can achieve angular resolution less than 
1° while other sonars use omnidirectional sensors that only alert to the presence of a target 
without any angular data (Bjorno, 2013). 
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Passive sonars usually consist of a hydrophone, basically an underwater 
microphone designed to receive sound waves. Most hydrophones are built using special 
ceramic materials that produce electric current when the water pressure around them 
changes (piezoelectric) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2018). 
Other underwater detection technologies are magnetometers, sensors which sense 
disturbance in a magnetic field caused by a metallic object. For short ranges laser-based 
detection systems can also perform underwater (Zha, 2019).  
UUVs are challenging targets for a sonar as most UUVs have low acoustic 
signatures for both passive and active sonars and tracking the UUV for a long period of 
time can be even more challenging as their signature is very dependent on the aspect angle 
(Acker 2016). 
To determine likely detection range, we utilized information from multiple sources. 
In (Button 2009) it was estimated that a UUV can carry a detection system with a UUV 
detection range of 0.25 NM (463 m) and from (Sun 2018) the detection range of current 
UUV systems is 100–500 m. Putting those together we used a reasonable UUV detection 
of about 500 m. 
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III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE  
To organize the complex undersea infrastructure environment across the regions of 
interest, both functional and physical analyses were conducted to aid in identification of 
commonalities and differences between the areas. Generally, the Gulf and Natuna regions 
share a common structure and defense situation. Both regions contain undersea 
communication cables and oil or gas pipelines with corresponding drilling/pumping 
platforms and switching nodes. Existing defenses are minimal and rely almost entirely on 
the difficulty in access due to depth. Redundant pipelines and systems provide limited 
failsafe operation. The only active defensive measures are from local coast guard or naval 
military forces. The two regions do have some differences both in size, scope and layout 
of the undersea infrastructure.  
A. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
There are two primary functions that must be conducted as a part of undersea 
infrastructure defense: sensing the threat, and responding to it—with assets assigned to 
perform one or both functions. In the most basic concept, this consists of an array of 
acoustic buoys as sensors, and a flotilla of response UUVs. Some of our larger models 
utilize supporting air assets and surface vessels to augment the sense and response 
functions at different levels of threat; in smaller models, only UUVs (with comparable 
sensor capabilities) are involved. 
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 Undersea Infrastructure Defense System Functions 
1. Sub-Functions 
Each of the primary functions has three sub-functions, as arranged in Figure 15: 
detection, classification, and localization fall under the sensing function, while pursuit, 
assessment, and engagement fall under the response function. Figure 16 shows the generic 
sequencing of these sub-functions; depending on the asset, these may be performed near-
simultaneously.  
 
 Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) 
a. Detection 
The initial detection of a threat is the critical starting point of the kill chain. Threat 
detection utilizes an array of sensor nodes and relay nodes, either around infrastructure or 
at key choke points, to find suspected threats. The geo-political climate can determine our 
defensive posture, and early warnings and indicators from reliable intelligence reports may 
help specify detection parameters and thresholds. 
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b. Classification 
The type of threat will determine which assets are used to prosecute it. A coast 
guard vessel might be used to intercept/inspect a commercial ship with suspected weapons; 
a swarm of UUVs would be deployed to defend against similar threat. Proper identification 
and classification of the threat is necessary to employ the appropriate assets and defensive 
measures. Depending on the asset, this sub-function can be performed near-simultaneously 
as detection. 
c. Localization 
As multiple sensors detect the threat, its specific location can be triangulated and 
transmitted to the response assets for pursuit. If the threat location is intermittent or lost, 
then a likely attack path can be extrapolated based on last known positions, vector, and 
other threat characteristics ascertained by the classification sub-function. A continuous 
update of the threat position and status among sensors, response assets, and command & 
control (C2) stations is crucial to the effectiveness of the defense system. 
d. Pursuit 
Response assets move towards the threat location. A destroyer would swiftly seek 
out the last position of an enemy submarine; point-defense UUVs would deploy from their 
charging docks to intercept an incoming UUVs or torpedo. Depending on the threat 
capabilities, additional assets may be employed or re-tasked to pursue the most dangerous 
or most probable threat. 
e. Assessment 
As response assets arrive at the threat position, they can determine method of 
prosecution. The current threat level or stage of attack certainly contributes to the 
assessment: if an attack is imminent or in progress, point-defense measures would be 
employed; if a threat is reported but not found (its position lost), search/patrol measures 
would be taken. Assessment also includes the determination of an appropriate engagement 
method, as well if the method was successful. 
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f. Engagement 
Response assets execute appropriate measures against a target to neutralize the 
threat. This can range from a simple inspection of a suspect vessel, to full deployment of 
UUV swarms, to anti-submarine warfare tactics by allied warships. Assets that can perform 
both sensor and response functions may already be in the location and can immediately 
assess/engage the threat (as with a coast guard ship intercepting and inspecting a 
commercial vessel suspected of carrying hostile UUVs or other weapons). Engagement 
continues until the threat is assessed to be incapacitated (mission kill) or eliminated (total 
kill). 
2. Defensive Schemes 
The performance of all functions of a defense system can be accomplished through 
effective positioning and layering of complementing assets. This can be employed through 
distinct schemes: area defense, point defense, barrier defense, or some combination of the 
three. Each defensive scheme is designed with a particular objective in mind. Point defense 
is defined as an attempt to protect a singular asset or position from an expected threat. 
Barrier defense is an attempt to maintain some sort of security perimeter to ensure that any 
asset or position within the barrier is better protected to a significant degree than assets or 
positions beyond the protect region. Area defense shares with barrier defense the same goal 
of improving the security of a designated region, but is differentiated in that defending 
assets are not confined physically to specific barriers paths, and instead patrol the entire 
region. Figure 17 provides an aid for conceptualization. 
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 Visualization of Defensive Schemes 
B. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The project team developed four models to help answer key questions that were 
brought to light during the initial research phase. These range from small scale models 
examining the tactical defense of underwater infrastructure in the Natuna Besar region 
against UUV to a large-scale model examining a theater-wide defense of the Gulf of 
Mexico against a wide range of threats. 
1. Natuna Besar Models 
The Natuna Besar models investigate the effectiveness of defending key 
infrastructure nodes (for example, single oil platforms) and the pipelines which connect 
them. Since Natuna Besar offshore oil and gas infrastructure is privately owned by various 
corporate consortiums from a large number of countries and is located in international 
waters with pipelines traveling through multiple nations EEZ, there is no single country 
that is solely responsible for their defense. Instead, a collaboration of private and multi-
national naval and coast guard activities are tasked with that duty. In the event that any 
country or group is particularly concerned with the safety of their infrastructure, the 
defensive schemes they employ will most likely be developed to protect their individual 
ownership of various segments of infrastructure rather than to protect the region as a whole. 
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As such, the Natuna Besar models developed with the perspective of defending the 
underwater gas infrastructure that supplies Singapore from the Natuna Besar region.  
Natuna Besar Model 1 focused on the point defense of critical infrastructure nodes 
that are in the gas fields from enemy UUV attacks. These include expensive oil platforms 
and accompanying systems which extract fossil fuels for transport via pipeline to the shore. 
This UUV-only model employs defensive UUVs which are either static or patrolling, and 
are assumed to have the same sensor capabilities and limitations as a stand-alone sensor 
buoy, thereby negating the need for a pre-existing or temporary array of sensors. The intent 
is to investigate the idea of whether an architecture of cheap, easily deployable UUVs with 
a long shelf-life could effectively provide point defense of key infrastructure nodes against 
UUV threats. Ideally, this type of defense would negate the need to develop, deploy, and 
maintain a static sensor array in the area. By reducing the types of assets, this model 
explored the idea of a minimally-manned, cost-effective defense that can be applied in 
almost any scenario—that is, a point-defense model that is indifferent of region, and can 
be implemented by any entity (corporate, military, or private). The anticipated threat for 
this model are UUVs of similar capability, which the point-defending UUVs quickly 
respond upon detection. As such, this model assumes a small timeframe to respond to the 
threat, and therefore emphasizes certain sub-functions, as shown in Figure 18. 
 
 FFBD of Natuna Besar Model 1 
Natuna Besar Model 2 investigated the defense of the long stretches of pipeline 
which connect the critical extraction nodes to the shore. It does so by looking at how 
combinations of static and patrolling UUVs and static underwater sensors can be employed 
in a barrier parallel to the defended asset to defend against threat UUVs. The lessons 
learned about defending the 4 km stretch can then be scaled up and applied relative to the 
overall length of the pipeline. While the anticipated threat is the same as Natuna Besar 
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Model 1, the incorporation of sensor arrays puts an emphasis on the localize sub-function, 
as shown in Figure 19. 
 
 FFBD of Natuna Besar Model 2 
2. Gulf of Mexico Models 
The Gulf of Mexico groups explored the defense of a large region. A conclusion 
from the initial research phase was that there are two primary goals that an attacker might 
have that could cause the most amount of damage to the United States. The first is the 
destruction of the large number of critical infrastructure nodes that would be required to 
disrupt a large portion of the offshore energy industry in the region. The second is to attack 
one of the critically vulnerable nodes in such a way as to cause catastrophic damage, similar 
to the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010. Either would have economic effects that could 
reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars. The models address these concerns by trying 
to determine what types of defensive arrangements could successfully defeat such attacks.  
Gulf of Mexico Model 1 sought to answer the question of how well a barrier of 
UUV and sensors could be utilized as a perimeter defense to keep underwater enemy UUVs 
from transiting submerged into the target rich environment of the Gulf of Mexico. The 
design is based on two staggered, 20 km rows of equally spaced sensor buoys, with UUV 
docking stations positioned every six kilometers. When an enemy UUV is detected by the 
sensors, they send targeting data to the UUV docking stations which launch Defender 
UUVs to destroy it. The anticipated threat for this model are UUVs of similar capabilities, 
but this model does explore the aspect of overspeed (the ability for defending UUVs to 
achieve higher maximum velocities than threat UUVs) to find and engage the threat. 
Additionally, the positioning of the sensor array is assumed to be far enough from the 
infrastructure to allow a substantial window of time to classify threats (Figure 20). 
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 FFBD of Gulf of Mexico Model 1 
Gulf of Mexico Model 2 examined the effectiveness of such a barrier when scaled 
up to a theater-wide defensive scheme against a wider range of threats, not just the long 
range LDUUV threat posited by Gulf of Mexico Model 1. The new threats are neutral 
flagged enemy cargo ships that are capable of sailing over the barrier undetected and either 
dropping off SDUUV in close proximity to their targets or acting as “Bomber Ships” 
themselves, dropping depth charges or even dragging their anchors to deal damage. In order 
to combat these additional threats, this model utilizes a defense in depth approach 
combining point, barrier, and area defense assets including ships, aircraft, UUV from 
underwater docking stations, and underwater sensor networks. The complexity of this 
model emphasizes all six sub-functions (Figure 21), particularly since classification and 
assessment allows for and necessitates the use of the appropriate assets to respond to the 
myriad of threats. 
 
 FFBD of Gulf of Mexico Model 2 
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IV. UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE: NATUNA 
BESAR 
The analysis of the underwater infrastructure defense in Natuna Besar is divided 
into two categories—pipelines transporting oil and underwater infrastructure of the oil 
mining platforms. The analysis is conducted separately because the latter is assessed to be 
a point defense around the platforms whereas the former was assessed to be the defense 
over a long corridor along the pipeline. 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) simulation is conducted on both 
categories to examine the CONOPS, performance and tradeoffs under different settings. 
Different scenarios for each category are assessed before focusing on the most threatening 
scenario for deeper analysis. Different parameters are experimented using a design of 
experiments framework, and the ensuing statistical analysis provided insights into how the 
different parameters affect cost and performance effectiveness. 
A. DEFENSE  OF SINGLE OIL PLATFORM 
This section covers the analysis of the defense of the oil mining platform. 
1. CONOPS Implementation 
a. Red CONOPS 
Figure 22 shows the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the Red Force. Their 
attack scenario comprises 5 phases: Preparation of mission, acquisition of 




 CONOPS Description—Pipeline Destruction  
It can be difficult to establish hostile intent during the first three phases, so the 
response solution focuses on the fifth phase, assuming that the hostile intent is determined 
in the fourth phase or the fifth phase. The enemy course of action involves the transport of 
the attacking assets on a ship that masquerades as a commercial vessel. The commercial 
vessel releases the attacking assets, which comprises of Unmanned Underwater Vessels 
(UUVs), before sailing away. After deployment, the UUVs travel to the oil platform 
infrastructure and any UUV that successfully arrives to the platform will execute an attack. 
The team focused on a scenario with a solo-diversion UUV combined with a swarm 
attack of other UUVs. This tactic allows the Red Force to achieve a high probability of 
success with the least number of UUVs.  
The Red plan is comprised of two phases. The first phase diverts Blue Force’s patrol 
defenses, opening a channel with less resistance. This is achieved by employing a single 
Red UUV to lure the Blue Force away from its defense position. The second phase involves 
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the infiltration of the attacking Red UUV swarm via the open channel. Two different modes 
of Red swarm attacks are considered: 
1. The Red Force UUVs converge on the oil platform from all directions as 
shown in Figure 23. We refer to this as the distributed approach. Note the 
large Red UUV represents the solo diversion UUV. 
 
 Red CONOPS Using Distributed Approach 
2. The Red Force UUVs approach the oil platform from a single direction as 
shown in Figure 24. We refer to this as the concentrated approach. The 
diversion UUV approaches separately from a different direction and 
heading. 
 
 Red CONOPS Using Concentrated Approach 
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b. Blue CONOPS 
Two defensive configurations are examined for the Blue Forces to defend the oil 
platform. They are: 
1. Blue Forces utilize a point defense strategy where defenders are stationed 
close to the oil platform and wait for Red Forces to approach before 
engaging the Red Forces. Figure 25 shows this Blue CONOPS. 
 
 Blue CONOPS Using Point Defense Strategy 
2. Blue Forces conduct patrols along the edges of a 6 km by 3.5 km rectangle 
that bounds the Anoa gas field and patrol in a clockwise direction. Figure 
26 shows this Blue CONOPS. 
 
 Blue Force Using Perimeter Defense CONOPS 
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The Blue UUVs are deployed with both defensive sensing and incident response. 
The following describes the assumptions about the defense setup: 
 No other detection assets are allocated to the defense area.  
 A blue UUV chases after any Red UUV that is detected by the blue 
UUV’s sensor 
 A blue UUV does not disengage from pursuing a detected Red UUV and 
will continue to chase the Red UUV until the Red UUV is killed. 
 When a blue UUV destroys a Red UUV or loses track of a Red UUV, it 
will return to its patrol (for patrolling configuration) or position (for point 
defense configuration).  
 If the blue UUV encounters a Red UUV on its way back to its patrol or 
position, the Blue UUV will engage it. 
 Blue UUVs are unable to communicate with one another, so each blue 
UUV is limited to its own sensor range.  
 
The assumptions and rules of engagement listed above reveal that Red’s diversion 
tactic can potentially be effective at distracting blue UUVs; specifically without the ability 
to communicate and coordinate, many Blue UUVs may pursue the diversion UUV for a 
long period of time. A sensor field is not considered since this is a defense of just one 
platform over a small area. A sensor field is more important when defending a corridor, 
where the blue UUVs benefit from acting earlier to intercept the Red UUV effectively in 
the area it is defending. While it is not considered in this implementation, having a sensor 
field as a secondary defense system could be useful as a failsafe mechanism if any hostile 
UUV manages to sneak through the defense barrier.  
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2. Systems Implementation 
The team developed an agent-based simulation in MANA to represent the scenario 
described in the previous section. Red has two attack modes (distributed or concentrated) 
and Blue has two defense modes (point or patrols); which yields four combinations that 
will be conducted in our simulation. The following systems are modelled in MANA for 
utilization in all four of the CONOPS: 
 A single oil platform that is to be defended 
 A squad of blue UUV assets, each carrying explosive payloads that can be 
fired at Red Force UUVs. 
 A single large diameter UUV that is used by the Red Force to divert the 
defenders. 
 A swarm of Red UUV assets. Each UUV carries a single explosive payload 
that is transported to the oil platform to be detonated to impair or destroy 
the oil platform. 
Table 7 shows the parameters that are used by the Red Forces and the Blue Forces 
in all four scenarios. The focus of the MANA simulation at this point is to determine the 
most effective CONOPS for each side. Hence, some parameters, such as number of 
munitions and weapon ranges, are set to artificially high limits. 
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Table 7 MANA System Configuration 
System System Parameters Value / Description 
Blue defending 
UUV 
Number of blue defending UUVs 22 
Movement speed 0 km/h during point defense 
13 km/h during patrol 
25 km/h during engagement of 
Red UUV 
Type of UUV Large diameter UUV 
Sensor detection and classification range for Red 
attacking UUV 
500 meters 
Sensor detection and classification range for Red 
diversion UUV 
2000 meters 
Sensor classification probability 0.5 
Blue probability of hit 0.5 
Number of hits to destroy Red 1 
Amount of ammo carried 15 
Weapon range 1000 m 
Red diversion 
UUV 
Number of Red diversion UUVs 1 
Movement speed 25 km/h 
Type of UUV Large diameter UUV 
Red attacking 
UUV 
Number of Red attacking UUVs 40 
Movement speed of Red attacking UUV 10 km/h 





A quantity of 22 Blue UUVs is chosen because that is the minimum number of 
UUVs needed to cover the detection edges of the 6 km by 3.5 km rectangle that bounds the 
Anoa gas field. 7 blue UUVs are required to cover the 6 km length and 4 Blue UUVs are 
required to cover the 3.5 km width of the rectangle. Thus, total number of Blue UUVs 
required = 2 × (7 + 4) = 22. Each Blue UUV will patrol in a clockwise direction with a 
detection capability of 500 m radius. 
In the MANA model, each Blue UUV has to detect a Red UUV with its sensor 
before a Blue UUV can attempt to intercept the Red UUV. During each model time step, a 
Blue UUV has a probability (based on the parameter “Sensor classification probability”) 
to successfully classify a Red UUV within its classification range (based on the parameters 
“Sensor detection and classification range for Red attacking UUV” and “Sensor detection 
and classification range for Red diversion UUV”). 
A blue UUV is only able to engage a Red UUV after successful classification. 
Subsequently, a weapon is launched to destroy the Red UUV. If the Blue UUV scores a 
one successful hit (based on the parameter “Blue probability of hit”) against a Red UUV 
(due to the parameter “Number of hits to destroy Red” being set to 1), the Red UUV is 
considered destroyed. 
3. Model 
In all four CONOPS, the Blue Forces will achieve their victory condition when they 
destroy all the attacking Red UUVs. The diversionary UUV does not count towards the 
requirement for the Blue Forces’ victory condition. The Red Forces achieve victory if at 
least one attacking UUV reaches the oil platform. 
The following assumptions are made for the models: 
 A single detonation of the explosive charge is carried by a Red UUV and is 
sufficient to compromise the functionality of the oil platform 
 The Red Forces are released sufficiently close to the target, so they will not 
run out of fuel. Hence, fuel utilization of the Red Forces is not modelled. 
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 It is not possible to establish hostile intent of a hostile vessel masquerading 
as a commercial vessel until they have unloaded the offensive UUVs. Thus, 
the simulation begins with the Red diversion and attacking assets in position 
to commence the attack, outside the sensor ranges of the Blue defenders. 
 The Red Force uses a diversion tactic to create a distraction for the 
defending Blue assets, while the attacking systems utilize stealth to close 
the distance to the oil platform it is targeting. The stealth factor is the main 
factor why the speed of the attacking assets is much slower than the 
defending assets. 
 Battery/fuel is not a limitation for the defending UUV assets because the 
point defenders are docked to a charging station until they need to be 
deployed, while the patrolling configuration can implement a shift rotation 




Figure 27 shows the scenario where the blue UUVs perform a point defense of the 
oil platform. The blue UUVs are organized in a ring of radius 500 m around the oil 
platform. The Red Forces will execute a concentrated attack with all 40 Red UUVs 
approach the platform together. The black lines indicate the movement directions of the 
Red UUVs. The blue UUVs in the Red rectangle are susceptible to the Red diversion UUV. 
Note these figures are not drawn to scale. 
 
 Blue Force Defense against Concentrated Red Force 
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Figure 28 shows the scenario where the Blue UUVs perform a point defense in a 
ring of radius 500 m around the oil platform against the squad of 40 Red UUVs executing 
a distributed attack on the oil platform. The Red UUVs are distributed around a circle of 
radius 3.46 km around the oil platform. The Red attacking UUVs close in on the oil 
platform simultaneously from all directions. The Blue UUVs in the Red rectangle are 
susceptible to the Red diversion UUV. 
 
 Blue Force Defense against Distributed Red Force  
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Figure 29 shows a Red concentrated attack against a Blue patrol defense. The Blue 
UUVs will perform a patrol in a rectangular formation in a clockwise direction. The 
rectangle has a length of 6 km and a width of 3.5 km and is centered on the oil platform. 
The black lines indicate the direction of movement of the Red Force UUVs. The Blue 
UUVs in the Red rectangle are susceptible to the Red diversion UUV.  
 
 Patrolling Blue Force against Concentrated Red Force 
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Figure 30 shows the scenario where the Blue UUVs perform a patrol around the oil 
platform in a rectangle against a Red distributed attack. The Red attacking UUVs will close 
in on the oil platform from all directions.  
 
 Patrolling Blue Force against Distributed Red Force 
B. ANALYSIS 
This section covers the results of the MANA simulation for the Natuna scenarios. 
The measure of effectiveness in the simulation is the probability of success of the Blue 
Forces in defending the oil platform. 
1. Scenarios Analysis 
Table 8 shows the results of the four combinations of attack and defense plans. 
Each scenario was simulated with 100 runs each on the MANA farmer software.  
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Table 8 CONOPS Results 
Scenario 
number 
Scenario description Number of Blue 
successes in 100 
runs 
Average number of 
Red attackers 
destroyed 
1 Concentrated Red Force 
against point defense Blue 
Force 
60 38.02 
2 Distributed Red Force 
against point defense Blue 
Force 
100 40 
3 Concentrated Red Force 
against patrolling Blue 
Force 
0 7.66 
4 Distributed Red Force 




The most threatening scenario for Blue is the case where the Red Forces make a 
concentrated attack from a single direction. Note the numbers in Table 8 are optimistic 
from Blue’s perspective because Blue UUVs hold unrealistically high ammunition. In 
reality, each Blue UUV will have a small amount of ammunition and so Blue will be at a 
greater disadvantage. In this preliminary analysis we merely wanted to evaluate fixed vs. 
patrol. In the next section we reduce ammunition levels to realistic levels.  
The defensive ring with radius of 500 m is too large because defenders at the 
opposite side of the circle could not detect the incoming Red Forces, so they did not move 
to engage them. Consequently, Blue would not deploy all defensive UUVs against a 
concentrated attack. The defensive ring is subsequently reduced, which will be discussed 
in the detailed analysis. 
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From a defensive perspective, a point defense strategy is more effective than to 
conduct a perimeter patrol. The patrolling model would need to defend a larger area, so the 
defense forces were spread thin. As a result, a concentrated attack by the Red attacking 
force easily overwhelmed the few defenders in the patrolling configuration. Furthermore, 
the Red diversion UUV also drew away the defenders which further reduced the reaction 
time against the Red attacking force, allowing them to bypass the defense line without 
resistance. This led to a catastrophic failure of the Blue Force’s defense configuration in 
patrolling scenarios.  
Another lesson learnt relates to the pursuit of the Red diversion UUVs. There is no 
maximum chase distance implemented for the Blue UUV, so it is possible for the diversion 
to draw a significant number of defenders away. If the Blue UUVs are able to communicate 
with each other and coordinate a response action, fewer UUVs would leave their position 
to investigate a contact. Consequently, there would not be large openings, which create an 
undefended sector, and Blue would be less susceptible to a diversion.  
In the next section, we focus on Scenario 1 to investigate how different parameters 
might affect the defense solution. This CONOPS is chosen because it provides the best 
results for each side where Red executes a concentrated attack and Blue uses point defense. 
2. Detailed Analysis 
a. Parameters 
Table 9 shows the parameters modeled in the simulation with design points varying 
the defense capability and the force size for Red. 
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Table 9 Parameters of Model 




Blue Probability of Hit Phit 0.5 1 
Number of Hits to Destroy Red Dred 1 2 
Number of Blue Ammo Carried Qammo 1 4 
Number of Blue UUVs Nblue 3 6 
Number of Red UUVs Nred 1 6 
Blue UUVs Speed v 10 km/ h 25 km/h 
Blue UUV Detection Range RD 100 m 1000 m 
Probability of Classification by Blue 
UUV 
Pc 0.5 1 
Blue Weapon Range Rw 2 m 5 m 
 
The Blue probability of hit is selected for further investigation to allow the team to 
investigate the effect of a highly sophisticated and maneuverable Red attacking UUV, 
which may be feasible in the near future. 
The number of hits to destroy Red is selected to simulate an adversary that is 
capable of employing countermeasures (analogous to chaff in air combat) or producing 
decoys (analogous to flares in air combat). 
The amount of Blue ammunition carried is chosen to investigate cost-benefit 
tradeoffs between having more Blue defending UUVs versus being able to carry more 
ammunition. 
The number of Red UUVs is varied to investigate the breaking point of the defense 
solution. 
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The numbers for Red UUVs and Blue UUVs in the scenarios are reduced from 40 
and 22 respectively to a maximum of 6. 22 Blue UUVs is the minimum required to 
surround the Anoa gas field perimeter without gaps and is kept constant across the previous 
four scenarios for fairness. Since the focus is on the oil platform, the area to be defended 
is much smaller, so 22 Blue UUVs were considered excessive. Hence, a maximum of six 
Blue UUVs was utilized for this simulation. 
To ensure that the scenario is still defendable, the number of Red UUVs must be 
reduced. It is obvious that if Red attacks have an overwhelming numeric advantage, it will 
succeed with certainty as it will use all of Blue’s defense capacity. The rule of thumb for a 
scenario to be considered reasonable is one where the following inequality holds: 
NBlue × Phit × Qammo ≥ Dred × NRed 
NBlue: number of blue UUVs 
Phit: blue probability of hit 
Qammo: quantity of blue ammo carried 
Dred: number of hits to destroy red 
NRed: number of Red UUVs 
Blue UUV speed is an important parameter because the amount of ammunition and 
the number of Blue UUVs have been greatly decreased, so all UUVs must be mobilized to 
repel the Red attacking force, including those on the opposite side of the circle defending 
the oil platform. A higher speed allows a Blue UUV on the opposite side of the circle 
surrounding the oil platform to move to engage the incoming Red attacking UUV 
successfully. 
Blue UUV detection range is important because a longer detection range gives the 
Blue UUVs more time to react to the incoming Red attacking UUVs. A hypothesis 
proposed is that the UUV detection range and the maximum speed of the UUV are closely 
related. 
The final MANA scenario is shown in Figure 31. It incorporates the lessons learnt 
from the first 4 CONOPS, which are: 
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 Reducing the radius from 500 m to 250 m. The radius is not reduced to zero 
because of concerns that the shockwave from the destruction of a Red 
attacking UUV that is too close to the oil platform might damage the oil 
platform. An average oil platform has a size of 122 m by 76 m. 
 The maximum distance that a Blue defending UUV will stray from its 
docking station is reduced to 250 m. This limits the effectiveness of the Red 
diversion tactic. 
 
 Varied Parameters of a Concentrated Blue Force Defense 
b. Results 
To perform an in depth analysis of the impact of each system parameter a 33 design 
point NOLH design was utilized. To account for model variability each design point was 
replicated 30 times, the average results for each design point are shown in Table 10. 
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1  1  1  2  4  5  19  719  0.73  5  96.7% 
2  0.95  2  1  4  3  13  775  0.66  5  0.0% 
3  0.94  1  4  3  1  19  747  0.52  3  100.0% 
4  0.78  2  4  4  6  12  831  0.53  3  16.7% 
5  0.97  1  2  4  4  21  466  0.78  2  96.7% 
6  0.98  2  2  4  3  13  241  0.94  2  0.0% 
7  0.84  1  4  4  1  20  438  0.95  5  100.0% 
8  0.77  2  4  4  6  14  297  1  4  3.3% 
9  0.83  1  2  5  5  15  100  0.59  4  0.0% 
10  0.88  2  2  5  2  18  184  0.69  5  60.0% 
11  0.86  1  3  6  3  11  213  0.58  3  36.7% 
12  0.89  2  3  6  5  25  522  0.7  3  100.0% 
13  0.8  1  2  5  4  12  972  0.89  3  100.0% 
14  0.92  2  2  6  2  18  944  0.86  3  100.0% 
15  0.81  1  4  6  3  10  691  0.88  4  100.0% 
16  0.91  2  3  6  5  24  606  0.83  4  96.7% 
17  0.75  2  3  5  4  18  550  0.75  4  90.0% 
18  0.5  2  3  5  2  16  381  0.77  2  96.7% 
19  0.55  1  4  5  4  22  325  0.84  2  96.7% 
20  0.56  2  1  6  6  16  353  0.98  4  0.0% 
21  0.72  1  1  5  1  23  269  0.97  4  100.0% 
22  0.53  2  3  5  3  14  634  0.72  5  93.3% 
23  0.52  1  3  5  4  22  859  0.56  5  100.0% 
24  0.66  2  1  5  6  15  663  0.55  2  0.0% 
25  0.73  1  1  5  1  21  803  0.5  3  100.0% 
26  0.67  2  3  4  2  20  1000  0.91  3  100.0% 
27  0.63  1  3  4  5  17  916  0.81  2  96.7% 
 
























































































































































































28  0.64  2  2  3  4  24  888  0.92  4  0.0% 
29  0.61  1  2  3  2  10  578  0.8  4  60.0% 
30  0.7  2  3  4  3  23  128  0.61  4  3.3% 
31  0.58  1  3  3  5  17  156  0.64  4  0.0% 
32  0.69  2  1  3  4  25  409  0.63  3  0.0% 
33  0.59  1  2  3  2  11  494  0.67  3  70.0% 
 
Recall, the rule of thumb for Blue Force to have a chance at success: 
NBlue × Phit × Qammo ≥ Dred × NRed 
 
The value on the left hand side can be viewed as the total effective firepower of 
Blue and the value on the right-hand can be viewed as Red’s effective force size. If Blue’s 
effective firepower is not greater than Red’s effective force size, then Blue cannot win. In 
order evaluate this hypothesis, we introduce a new parameter F representing Blue’s 
firepower advantage. 
F = (NBlue × Phit × Qammo)—(Dred × NRed). 
 
A negative firepower advantage is regarded as an essentially impossible mission 
because there is insufficient ammunition to take out the Red Forces.  
Figure 32 shows the relationship between fire power advantage and the probability 
of success. There are five design points in Figure 32 (two of them are very close together) 
that have negative values for fire power advantage and all of them correspond to Blue 
failure. Those are design points 2, 20, 24, 28 and 32. Figure 32 confirms our hypothesis 
about the importance of firepower advantage.  
59 
 
 Probability of Success vs Fire Power Advantage 
While not surprising that scenarios with negative firepower produced no successes, 
there are several scenarios that have very low success probabilities even with a firepower 
advantage. In particular, design point 11 has a significant firepower advantage (12.48) but 
less than a 40% success probability. Investigation of design point 11 reveals a slow UUV 
speed of (11 km/h) and a short detection range of 213 m. This shows that firepower is not 
the only factor for success and motivates us to account for other factors.  
Another hypothesis about what drives Blue’s success is the higher values of Blue 
UUV speed (v) and higher Blue UUV detection range (RD). If the Blue Force cannot 
effectively find, classify, localize, track, and engage the adversary, then firepower has 
limited value. This hypothesis ties in strongly to the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act 
(OODA) loop, where the increased Blue UUV detection range improves the observe 
portion, while the faster Blue UUV speed and higher firepower advantage contribute to the 
Blue Forces’ capability to act. 
To test this hypothesis, we modified our firepower advantage F to incorporate the 
importance of the OODA variables. We multiply F, v and RD, and call this parameter OA 
advantage: 𝑂𝐴 𝐹 𝑣 𝑅 .We choose OA advantage for Observe and Act. We define OA 
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in this manner for a few reasons. First it is simple and increases in F, v, and RD. Second 
increasing any of the inputs F, v, RD by a certain percentage has the same impact on the 
output OA. We primarily wanted to create one parameter that incorporates the OODA 
variables and examine how well this parameter predicts the outcome. Later we will 
examine additive relationships (rather than multiplicative) when we perform linear 
regression. Figure 33 shows the relationship between this new parameter OA advantage 
and mission success. 
 
 Probability of Mission Success vs Observe and Act 
Advantage 
From Figure 33, there appears to be strong support for this new hypothesis. An OA 
advantage greater than 30,000 greatly improves the probability of mission success with 
P(success) having values of 90% and above. 
Given the importance of Blue firepower, speed, and detection range, we form a 




 Partition Tree of Key Parameters 
Not surprisingly the partition tree indicates that firepower is an important 
parameter. Scenarios with firepower above 2.56 generate an average success probability of 
0.88, while those below that threshold have an average success probability of only 0.19. 
The detection range also has a significant impact on the battle outcome. When the detection 
range of Blue UUVs is 381 meters or above and firepower is greater than 2.56, P(Success) 
is 0.98.  
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The analysis indicates that firepower advantage is the most decisive factor to 
achieve victory. Firepower advantage comprises of 5 different factors—Blue UUV 
probability of hit, quantity of Blue UUV ammo carried, the number of Blue UUV, number 
of Red UUV and the number of hits to destroy a Red UUV. The number of Red UUV is 
beyond the control of the defense solution. However, the remaining parameters are within 
the control of Blue to some degree, and through systems development, Blue can evaluate 
the most cost-effective way to increase firepower.  
To conclude we examine the tradeoff between firepower and speed or detection 
range. We first implement a stepwise regression. The response variable Y is P(Success), 
while the independent variables are Firepower, Blue UUV speed, and UUV detection 
range. Interaction terms are also included in the regression.  
Figure 35 shows the effect summary of the best fit regression model. This figure 
ranks the coefficients in order of statistical significance. Firepower and detection range 
appeared as main effects with a P-value of below 0.01.  
 
 Effect Summary of Stepwise Regression 
Figure 35 is a prediction profiler to provide a visual representation on how changing 
each of the 3 parameters settings would impacts the response variable, P(Success). It is 
observed that an increase in either of the 3 parameters would positively affect P(Success). 
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 Effect Summary of Stepwise Regression 
As detailed in (Whitcomb and Beery, 2016), contour profilers were built in JMP to 
investigate the tradeoff between firepower and UUV speed.  Figure 37 shows the contour 
profile that was generated. The contour plot fixed detection range at 382 m and determines 
the combination of speed and firepower that will generate a predicted success probability 
of 0.99 (based on the regression model). These combinations appear as the white envelope 
in Figure 37. 
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 Contour Profile of Firepower and Blue UUV Speed 
Two observations were made from the contour plot. The first observation is the 
confirmation of the earlier hypothesis that UUV speed is an operationally important factor 
for OA advantage, even though speed was not statistically significant at the 0.01 level in 
our regression. From the contour plot, a higher Blue UUV speed can be traded for lower 
fire power advantage to achieve the same probability of Blue mission success.  
The second observation is the shape of the curve, which decreases in a convex 
fashion. Consequently, a slower UUV speed needs to be compensated with a much higher 
firepower to achieve the same P(Success). As speed increases from an initial slow level, 
the corresponding firepower requirement drops quickly. However, continuing to increase 
speed has diminishing benefits. 
The contour profiler in JMP was also used to investigate the tradeoff between 
firepower and UUV detection range. Figure 38 shows the contour profile that was 
generated in a similar fashion to Figure 37. This contour plot fixed Blue UUV speed at 20 
km/h, Figure 38 displays a linear tradeoff between firepower and detection range. For every 
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additional 100m in detection range, firepower can decrease by 1.3. Figure 38 summarizes 
the conclusions and recommendations for the section. 
 





Table 11 Evaluation of Main Effects 
Observation Deduction / Recommendation
Blue Force Fire 
Power as a 
significant effect to 
P(Success) 
The Blue Force fire power is determined to be a main effect 
with significant influence on P(success). The recommendation 
is to place emphasis on developing the  3 main constituent 
factors under the defender’s control– Blue UUV probability of 
hit, quantity of Blue UUV ammo carried, and number of Blue 
UUV. 
Blue UUV detection 
range has a 
significant effect to 
P(Success) 
The Blue Force should place emphasis on developing 
technologies to allow a breakthrough in detection range at low 
cost; this parameter may be equally or more cost-effective 
compared to building UUVs at lower cost. 
UUV Speed is 
operationally 
important 
A slower UUV speed needs to be compensated with a much 
higher firepower to achieve the same P(Success). 




This parameter has similar effect to deploying more UUVs. An 
alternative to increasing the amount of ammo would be to 
increase the scale and quantity of UUV units deployed. 
Blue Weapon Range 
is not significant 
As Blue is implementing a point defense with an advancing 
threat, this parameter only really affects when Blue fires on Red 
and has very little impact on success. In other scenarios where 
pursuit is involved, weapon range may be a more important 
factor. 
 
C. NATUNA BESAR MODEL 2 (NB2)  
1. Scenario  
The East Natuna Gas fields are located east of Peninsula Malaysia and west of the 
Natuna Islands. Extracted gas is transported to Singapore via an undersea pipeline between 
the gas field and Singapore. The pipeline lies along a busy shipping lane, where a 
significant portion of the world shipping tonnage passes through and is shown in Figure 39 




 Natuna Besar Pipeline  
 




Given that the pipes lie along a busy shipping way east of Peninsular Malaysia, 
many ships traverse over the pipes daily. The attack scenario focused on a Red shipping 
vessel releasing a UUV, whose mission is to destroy the gas pipe. The UUV attempts to 
achieve this objective by carrying an explosive payload to the pipe while trying to avoid 
defense forces. Given the overlap between the shipping lane and the gas pipe, the adversary 
UUV could be released as close as 4km to the pipeline. This allows the adversary to get 
close to the pipe, without drawing any undesired attention to itself.  
Surveillance around the pipe would be provided by a sensor field to detect any 
intrusion by adversary UUVs. Once detected, the adversary UUV will be handled by Blue 
shooter UUVs. Figure 41 shows the proposed placement of the shooters. Some shooters 
deploy from static positions while others actively patrol.  
The fixed shooter concept is a sequence of stationary pods that each contain mini 
UUVs used to attack the adversary UUV. The mini UUV would be armed with a warhead. 
Targeting information is transmitted from sensors to mini UUVs (e.g., via a wire). If the 
sensor field does not provide enough useful targeting information, a mini UUV could also 
be equipped with its own sensor. An example of such a mini UUV would be a wire-guided 
torpedo. Upon detection of an adversary UUV by the sensor field, a mini UUV would be 
launched against it. The number of UUVs that the fixed shooter pod could counter is 
directly proportionate to the number of mini UUVs in the pod. If there was a requirement 




 Proposed Defense System 
Patrolling shooters are autonomous UUVs that are equipped with their own sensors. 
In the analysis, the patrolling shooters do not receive any exogenous information from the 
sensor field, and thus do not have the luxury of a global picture as the fixed shooters use. 
This assumption is made because of the difficulty of undersea communication across larger 
distances and areas which the patrolling shooters inherently need to operate in. Hence, the 
patrollers transverse around the area and conduct barrier searches to detect the presence of 
any adversary UUVs. A patroller will only detect and react to a threat UUV if the patroller 
detects it with the patroller own organic sensor. The patrollers are equipped with a single 
warhead to be used for engagement with the adversary UUVs. A patrolling shooter will be 
expended should it engaged with the enemy and activate its warhead.  
2. Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made regarding the scenario: 
1. The underwater environment is free of an impediment to movement. This 
assumption is reasonable and conservative since the adversary would stand 
to gain the most from the lack of impediment. Any impediment could be 
utilized by the defender to harden the defense. 
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2. The pipe is only able to withstand a single hit. This assumption is reasonable 
and conservative because the pipe is not designed for blast impact and any 
puncture in the pipeline would cause loss of pressure and disruption of gas 
supply, and in the worst-case complete shutdown of supply. 
3. The adversary UUV attacks the pipe and does not attack the defense forces, 
avoiding it altogether. This assumption is reasonable because the Red 
force’s objective is the pipe and thus would be focused on attack. In 
addition, attacking any Blue UUV along the way to the pipe would alert the 
defender, making it more difficult for Red to execute a successful attack. 
4. The adversary UUV has knowledge of the pipe position and heads in 
directly toward the pipe without having to search. This assumes the 
adversary has performed reconnaissance ahead of time, and is a 
conservative assumption as it gives Red an advantage  
5. The scenario begins upon detection of adversary UUV by the sensor field. 
Recall that this information is only passed to fixed shooters; the patrolling 
shooters still must detect the adversary UUV on their own. This overstates 
the effectiveness of the system as there may be situations where the 
adversary UUVs are never detected by the sensor field. However, the 
model’s primary focus is to analyze the effectiveness of using fixed and 
patrolling shooters in defending the pipelines. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume the model starts upon detection of the adversary UUV in the area 
by the sensor field.  
3. MANA Implementation 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) was selected as the simulation tool 
for the study. The MANA Farmer extension was used to vary the values of variables across 
each simulation run and collate results efficiently. The simulation focused on the number 
of static shooters and patrolling shooters required to defend against an adversarial UUV of 
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varying capabilities. The results from the simulations can provide insight into how to 
design a cost-effective mix between static shooters and patrolling shooters.  
a. Environment 
The scenario is implemented in MANA as a 4km by 4km map. It is expected that 
the shipping vessel would release the adversary UUV within 4km of the pipeline as 
described in the scenario. A single time step in the model is five seconds. The battlefield 
is modelled from a top-down perspective and models the actions of agents in a 2-D X-Y 
cartesian grid. The adversarial forces are designated as Red agents, with the defense force 
designated as Blue agents. None of the agents are affected by either terrain or the 
background layers. Figure 42 shows the overview of the MANA setup. 
 
 MANA Implementation of  Fixed and Patrolling Shooters 
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b. Blue Agents 
Four different types of agents are modelled as part of the simulation. The agents 
are as follows: (1) Patrolling Shooters (2) Fixed Shooters (3) Blue sensor field and (4) Pipe 
agents.  
c. Blue Sensor Field 
The sensor field is modeled as one sensor that continuously provides track 
information on the Red UUV’s position to the fixed shooters. The sensor field does not 
communicate with the patrolling shooters. Recall that the model begins upon an exogenous 
Red detection. The sensor only provides track information after the initial detection. The 
sensor range covers the entire battlefield, with its probability of track varied between 0.5 
and 1. The probability of track would be affected according to the capabilities of sensor 
used. The target information is continuously passed to the fixed shooters via wired 
connections.  
d. Patrolling Shooters 
Patrolling shooters are spawned at random locations within a designated box along 
the pipe as shown in Figure 43 and Figure 44. They perform a circular patrol via designated 
waypoints. There are multiple sets of waypoints, all of which perform a circular patrol loop. 
The different initial waypoints ensure that the agents do not travel together in a cluster.  
The quantity, speed and sensor range of the UUVs are varied as part of the analysis. 
Each patrolling shooter is equipped with a single warhead. The weapon range for the 
patrolling shooters is kept to a minimum of 5m, which is to simulate an explosive blast. 
The patrolling shooters cease any further operations upon exploding with an adversary 
UUV. 
Each patrolling shooter is also equipped with an onboard sensor to enable it to 
detect and track adversary UUVs; this organic sensing capabilities is necessary as the 
patrollers do not receive any detection or tracking information from the sensor field. 
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 Spawn Point Location in MANA 
 
 
 Variety of Waypoints Used to Set the UUV’s Patrolling 
Path 
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e. Fixed shooters 
The fixed shooter UUVs are guided to the Red agent via the information provided 
by the Blue sensor field. A single shooter UUV will be deployed to intercept each Red 
UUV that breaks through.  
The fixed shooter pods are spaced equally along the pipe. The distance between 
pods was varied in the analysis to determine the maximum distance beyond which the fixed 
shooter is unable to intercept the Red agent. This provides an insight into the number of 
shooters that are needed to be placed along the pipeline to provide full coverage against a 
single Red agent.  
Similarly, the quantity, speed and sensor range of the UUVs are varied as part of 
the experiment. Weapon range for the agents is kept to a minimum of 5m, which is to 
simulate an explosive blast. Once a fixed shooter agent detonates, it ceases any further 
operations and does not participate in any further interaction with the rest of the simulation. 
The fixed shooters also have their own sensors. Given that sensor field is not 
perfect, the fixed shooter agent is given its own sensor (which was also varied in quality) 
to localize the adversary UUV if the sensor field is unable to properly track the adversary 
UUV.  
f. Pipe Agents 
Pipe agents are placed along with the position of the pipes and serve as a target 
point for the Red agent. 
g. Red Agent 
The Red agent consists of a sole agent, representing an enemy UUV. The objective 
of the Red agent is to attack the pipe while avoiding contact with any Blue UUVs en route. 
This is modelled using personalities in the MANA simulation, with a small priority for 
reaching the pipe. The speed of the Red UUV and the distance of its sensor range are varied 
to test the capabilities of the defense system.  
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Initial simulations showed that Red’s initial detection point is important. The closer 
Red is detected to the pipeline, the less time Blue can react with shooters. Adjusting the 
detection point was used to evaluate how far the Blue sensor field needs to provide 
surveillance coverage to ensure the defending forces can react and intercept the incoming 
threat.  
h. Design of Experiment 
Due to the limitation in Mana Farmer on accepting zero agents as a valid entry, 
three separate simulations were conducted.  
 
Table 12 Blue Assets Allocation per Simulation 
 Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 
Sensor Field 
(linked to fixed shooter) 
√  √  
Fixed Shooter √  √ 
Patrolling Shooter  √ √ 
 
The first simulation primarily serves to establish the maximum distance that the 
fixed shooter pods can be placed apart from each other on the pipe while still providing 
adequate defense coverage. This inter-UUV spacing is directly related to how many UUVs 
are required to defend an area of interest. The second simulation studies the impact of 
varying the number of patrol shooters. The third simulation with both patrol UUVs and 
fixed shooters determines the ideal mix of Blue agents. 







Table 13 MANA Farmer Parameter Configuration 
Agent Parameters Description Units Min Max 
Fixed 
Shooter 
Inter-UUV spacing  Half Distance between Blue 
Fixed Shooters. 
meter 100 4000 
Speed of Blue Fixed 
UUV 
Speed of the wired UUVs 
launched by the Fixed Shooters 
km/h 10 40 
Blue Fixed UUV 
Detection range 
Fixed UUV sensor detection 
range 
meter 100 300 
Patrolling 
Shooter 
Number of Blue 
Patrol UUVs 
Number of patrolling UUVs - 0 40 
Speed of Blue 
Patrol  
Speed of patrolling UUVs km/h 10 40 
Blue Patrol UUV 
Detection range 
Patrolling UUV sensor detection 
range 





Detection probability of the 
sensor 
- 0.5 1 
Red UUV Speed of Red UUV Speed of Red adversary UUV km/h 10 40 
Red Detected Pt Distance away from pipeline the 
Red UUV was detected 
meter 500 4000 
Red UUV 
Detection range 
Red UUV sensor detection range. meter 100 300 
 
The inter-UUV spacing is presented as the half the distance between Blue fixed 
shooters because the worst case for Blue is if Red approaches halfway between two pods 
as shown in Figure 45. 
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 Inter-UUV Spacing 
A design of experiments generator was used to define 33 design configurations. To 
account for model variability each design configuration was replicated 30 times, resulting 
in a total of 990 total model runs. 
D. ANALYSIS 
JMP was used to analyze the data produced by the MANA simulations. Stepwise 
regression and least square regression analysis were performed on the simulation results. 
Stepwise regression was initially conducted to filter out the important factors and 
relationships (such as polynomial, factorial). A model with good adjusted R-square value 
and a reasonable number of factors was then put through least square regression analysis. 
Analysis for each of the three scenarios listed in Table 12 is presented separately. 
1. Fixed Shooters 
In this scenario, the Blue forces only consist of the sensor field and fixed shooters 
to defend the pipeline against a single Red adversary; there are no Blue patrolling shooters. 
Table 14 shows the parameters used for the stepwise analysis. Each variable was included 
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as both a linear and quadratic term. The interaction terms were also included in the initial 
regression. 
 




P(Blue Success): Probability of Blue successfully defending 
the pipe 
Parameters Red Detected Pt 
Speed of Red UUV 
Red UUV Detection range 
Blue Inter-UUV Spacing 
Speed of Blue Fixed UUV 
Blue Fixed UUV Detection range  
Buoy Sensor Detection Probability 
 
Based on the stepwise analysis, Table 15 shows the relevant factors that were used 
to generate the final model for the least square regression, where the selected model has an 
R-squared value of 0.86. The R-squared value is a measure of the fraction of variance 
explained by the model, so the closer to one implies a better model.  
 








Speed of Red UUV 
Speed of Blue Fixed UUV 
Blue Inter-UUV Spacing 
Red Detected Pt 
Red Detected Pt* Blue Fixed UUV Detection range  
Blue Fixed UUV Detection range* Blue Fixed UUV 
Detection range 
Blue Fixed UUV Detection range  
 
The regression results are shown in Figure 46, which shows both the Predicted Plot 
and the Effect Summary. The Predicted Plot shows the difference between the actual 
success probability and the predicted probability from the model. The Effect Summary 
79 
shows the logworth of each coefficient in the regression model. Variables with a higher 
logworth have a more statistically significant impact on the probability of success. The 
results reveal the main factors that have a statistically significant impact on the mission 
success are speed of the adversarial UUV, speed of fixed shooter, Blue inter-UUV spacing, 
distance from the pipe when the Red UUV is first detected and the Blue Fixed UUV 
detection range.  
 
 Predicted Plot and Summary for Fixed Shooters 
Figure 47 shows the prediction profiler for the model. The figure shows how each 
individual parameter affects the probability of success holding the other variables constant. 
For example, an increase in the speed of the Red UUV or a decrease in Red’s detection 
distance results in a decrease in the success probability. A Red UUV with a higher speed 
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is more difficult to chase and interdict, and the closer an adversary UUV is first detected 
to the pipeline, the less time for the shooters to react. For the parameters affecting Blue 
UUV, an increase in the speed of Blue UUV or a decrease in Blue inter-UUV spacing 
increases the probability of defending the pipe. Higher speed allows the Blue UUV to more 
easily chase the adversary, and a closer launch point allows the Blue UUVs to better handle 
shorter response times. An increase in Blue detection range also initially increases the 
success probability; however, it exhibits diminishing improvement after 200m. 
 
 
 Prediction Profiler for Fixed Shooters 
Commanders want a very high probability of success, and therefore parameter 
combinations that generate a success probability of 0.95 were examined. Two parameters 
were varied simultaneously while holding the other ones fixed. The parameters are listed 
in Table 16. 
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Table 16 Fixed Shooters Contour Plot Parameters 
Parameters of interest Values 
Blue Fixed UUVs inter-spacing distance 100–4000 meters 
Blue fixed UUV speed 10–40 km/h 
Fixed Parameters Values 
Red UUV detected point 3500 meters 
Red UUV speed 20 km/h 
Blue fixed UUV detection range 200 meters 
 
Figure 48 presents a tradeoff plot that specifies the speed required for a certain 
spacing to generate a predicted success probability of 0.95. For example, if the spacing 
between fixed shooter pods is 1000m, then the UUVs need to travel at speed of 24km/h or 
greater to achieve a 0.95 success probability. This assumes the other parameters are fixed 
as in Table 16 
The inter-UUV spacing directly relates to the number of Blue fixed UUVs required 
in a specific operation area. Figure 48 shows the feasible solution region in white and the 
infeasible solution region in red. The estimated gradient of the limit boundary line is 
0.0075. This implies that for every additional 1000m inter-UUV spacing, the Blue UUV 
requires an increase of 7.5km/h to maintain the system’s rate of mission success. This 
provides useful information in performing a cost-benefit analysis of many lower-speed 




 Blue UUV Speed vs. Spacing Results 
The regression results assume a linear relationship, however inspection of the 
predicted plot in Figure 46 and the partition plot in Figure 49 reveals many extreme 
outcomes of close to 0 and 1. The results of the simulation are fairly binary, with many 
design points producing near certain success of failure. Next, the Partition tool in JMP was 
used to formulate classification trees based on the success probability. This provides insight 
into whether a certain threshold of factors exists in affecting the success probability. 
Results were partitioned by Blue inter-UUV spacing followed by Blue UUV speed. These 
two factors were chosen based on the results in Figure 47 and Figure 48. The Red factors 
were not considered because they are not within the defender’s control.  
The partition results suggest a threshold of 1600m for the inter-UUV spacing. 14 
out of 20 models with values above 1600m produced almost zero success probability and 
8 out of 13 below 1600m had probability 1. Further partitioning on Blue speed, results 
show that when spacing is below 1600 and Blue UUV speed is above 26 km/h, 6 out of 8 
models produced near 1 success probability. Examining the contour plot in Figure 48, a 
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spacing of 1600m requires a speed of 29km/h and above to produce near certain success. 
Thus, the two different analyses generate similar results and insights.   
 
 Partition Tree of Inter-UUV Spacing and Speed 
Finally based on the regression results, combinations of variables that produce 
predicted success probabilities near 0.5 or 0.7 were generated. These points were generated 
randomly based on the predicted regression equation; that is using plots similar to Figure 
2 but using 0.5 and 0.7 rather than 0.95. Multiple parameter values close to the boundary 
of these two limits were sampled and then the scenario was simulated in MANA. Based on 
the simulations, the models of 0.7 limit yielded results near probability of 1 while models 
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of 0.5 limit yielded results near probability of 0. This suggests that the success probability 
might be closer to a piecewise constant function in relation to the input factors. The 
configuration of factors that predicts a probability of 0.7 or more in the linear regression 
actually achieves close to probability 1 in reality. While those predicting a probability of 
0.5 or less in the linear regression actually achieves a success probability close to 0. 
2. Patrolling Shooters 
The second scenario only incorporates patrollers with no fixed shooters. Figure 50 
illustrates the set up in MANA. The patrolling shooters do not get any sensor information 
from the sensor field and are dependent on their on-board sensors. A Red UUV is only 
detected by the patrolling shooters when it comes within range of the on-board sensor. The 
patrolling shooters main tactic is to transverse the area and conduct barrier searches. A 
patrolling shooter will detect and attempt to interdict any adversary UUV that crosses the 
patroller sensor footprint. The aim of the simulation is to determine the appropriate number 
of Patrolling shooters to defend the pipe.  
 
 
 Patrolling Shooters MANA Simulation 
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Stepwise analysis was conducted to choose the variables for regression. The 
following parameters were included as design variables:  
1. Speed of Red UUV  
2. Red UUV sensor range 
3. Number of Blue shooters  
4. Speed of the shooters 
5. Sensor range of shooters  
Linear and quadratic terms were added for these inputs as well as their interaction 
terms. The selected model using Standard Least Squares and has an R squared value of 
0.91. The variables in the final model appear in Table 17.  
 








Speed of Red UUV 
Speed of Blue Patrol Shooters 
No. of Blue Patrol shooter 
Red UUV Sensor range 
Speed of Blue Patrol Shooters*Red UUV Sensor range 
No. of Blue Patrol shooter*Red UUV Sensor range 
Blue Patrol Shooter Sensor range 
 
Figure 51 summarizes the main effects of the fitted model. The speeds of both Red 
and Blue have the most statistically significant impact on the success probability. The 
success rate is also affected to a smaller extent by the number of Blue patrolling shooters 
and Red’s detection range.  
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 Predicted Plot and Effects Summary for Patrolling Shooters 
Figure 52 shows the prediction profiler where the impact of success probability 
against one variable at a time was evaluated. The main take away is that the speed of Red 
or Blue is also operationally very important. The faster the speed of Red, the lower the 
probability of Blue success. The speed of Red UUVs would have to be mitigated by a 
combination of both higher speed and quantity of Blue patrollers. 
This is further illustrated by Figure 53, which presents the trade-off between the 
speed of the Blue patrollers versus the number of Blue patrollers. The plot displays the 
combination required to generate a 0.95 success probability with detection ranges and Red 
UUV speed remaining constant as shown. With the speed of Red UUV fixed at 15 km/h, 
only 1 Blue UUV is required when the Blue UUV’s speed is 40km/h. On that other extreme, 
40 UUVs are required when the speed of the UUV is only 25 km/h. Depending on the 
technological cost of having a UUV with faster speed, versus simply many slower UUVs, 
a decision can be made on the optimum mix between speed and quantity. 
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 Prediction Profiler for Patrolling Shooters. 
 
 
 Speed Versus Number of Blue Patrollers 
3. Fixed and Patrolling Shooters 
The final scenario included both fixed and patrolling shooters. To study the 
combined contribution of fixed and patrolling shooters in greater detail, the range of 
parameter values for both are selected from design points that produce a 0.50 and below 
success probability in the respective scenario above. The main objective was to determine 
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if two relatively poorly performing defensive approaches could combine to enhance the 
overall effectiveness. The range of values defined for this scenario is shown in Table 18. 
 
 Fixed Shooters and Patrolling Shooters  
To better isolate and extricate the effect in using combination of fixed shooters and 
patrollers, less variables are chosen to vary in this scenario. The speed of the Red UUV 
was fixed at 20 km/h and the Red Detection Point was fixed at 3500 m. 
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Table 18 Simulation 3 Variables 
Agent Description Units Min Max 
Fixed Shooter Inter-UUV spacing (Blue 
Fixed SpawnPt) 
meter 2000 4000 
Speed km/h 11 21 
Patrolling 
shooters 
Number of UUVs - 15 25 
Speed km/h 14 24 
Red UUV Sensor Range meter 100 300 
 
The results did not reveal synergies and improved overall performance; the best 
result still only generated a success probability of around 0.5. In general, the results of the 
combined system closely resembled that of the patrollers only scenario. This suggests that 
the success probability in this combined scenario is mainly attributable to the patrolling 
shooters. Recall from the earlier discussion of the fixed-shooter-only scenario: design 
points that generated a predicted probability of 0.5, were often closer to 0 in reality. 
Therefore, the parameter combinations that were considered in the combined scenario 
produce fixed shooter defenses that are nearly worthless. 
In Figure 55 and Figure 56, the black lines indicated the parameters which had a 
predicted probability of success of 0.5 from the fitted model in the simulation with just 
patrolling shooters. This sits closely near to the magenta division, which indicated the 




 Speed of Red UUV vs Blue Spawn Point 
 
 Number of Blue Patrollers vs Speed of Fixed UUVs 
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4. Conclusion 
The results from Natuna model 2’s three simulations provided insights for the 
composition of a defense system along the Natuna gas pipeline. The first simulation 
modeled the use of only fixed shooters only, the second modeled the use of patrolling 
shooters only, while the third simulation modeled the use of both types of shooters.  
Based on the overall results from the three simulation scenarios, it is not 
recommended to deploy a combination of fixed shooters and patrolling shooters. This 
follows from the binary nature of the fixed shooters. If the fixed shooters are capable 
enough to defend, then the fixed shooters alone would effectively defend most Red attacks 
and adding patrolling shooters would provide little benefit. On the other hand, if the fixed 
shooters are not capable, the fixed shooters would fail against most Red attacks; in this 
case it would be more cost effective to just deploy patrollers. Instead, the two assets could 
be thought of as two separate layers of defense. The patrolling shooters could deploy much 
further out beyond the wired-guided fixed shooter defense range, so that the patrollers 
perform a separate role of early elimination of threats. The fixed shooter can only engage 
targets close to the pods near the pipe due to its guide wire length limitation.  
The speed differential between Blue and Red is the crucial parameter for both the 
fixed shooter and patroller scenarios. Knowledge of the speeds can provide insight into 
other parameter requirement, such as the spacing in the fixed shooter scenario. For 
example, assuming that the adversary could be detected 3.5km away from the pipe and had 
a speed of 20 km/h, and the fixed shooter had a speed of 26 km/h, an inter-spacing of 3.2km 
is required between each fixed shooter. 
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V. UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE: GULF OF 
MEXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter III, two distinct analyses of undersea infrastructure defense 
in the Gulf of Mexico were conducted. Each analysis utilized an agent-based simulation 
program called Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA). The first analysis (Gulf 
One) focused on an in-depth examination of micro level considerations for the deployment 
of an undersea sensing array with supporting UUV systems. The second analysis (Gulf 
Two) focused on a macro level examination of a multi domain undersea infrastructure 
defense system. 
B. GULF ONE—MICROSCALE EXAMINATION OF SENSOR ARRAYS 
AND UUVS 
1. Micro Scale Scenarios 
The Gulf of Mexico contains an abundant amount of critical natural resources that 
are extracted by an elaborate network of infrastructure consisting mainly of oil / gas 
pipelines and oil rigs. Multiple courses of action are plausible in which a given threat could 
potentially attack the infrastructure via subsurface, surface, or air.  
The scenario we focus on, based on its potential destructiveness, feasibility and 
likelihood, is an enemy launch of a threat Red UUV from a commercial container ship. The 
commercial container ship, which can carry thousands of cargo containers, would have a 
route charted for a country other than the United States. The ship would stay outside the 
U.S. Economic Exclusion Zone in international waters (to achieve maximum covertness) 
and deploy pre-programmed Red UUVs with target coordinates being oil platforms in the 
Gulf of Mexico. Figure 57 represents the enemies COA. 
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 Enemy Course of Action in the Gulf of Mexico 
Phase I shows the container ship en-route to a drop zone. Phase II shows the ship 
reaching the drop zone followed by phase III.a where the UUVs are deployed from a 
container and move toward the target zone. Finally phase III.b shows the ship en-route to 
a port to offload its commercial cargo with no one suspicious that the cargo ship had just 
deployed Red UUVs. 
Figure 58 displays a multi layered defense network that could potentially combat 
against this specific threat. 
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 Conceptualized Defensive Network 
While the enemy mother ship carrying Red UUVs could be intercepted in 
international waters before launch (this is explored in the Macroscale examination later in 
this chapter), this scenario assumes the enemy has launched the Red UUVs and the UUVs 
are approaching the defense network. While Coast Guard, Navy ships, and aircraft may be 
in the area to provide detection and interdiction capabilities, an electric UUV moving very 
slowly would be extremely hard to detect from a surface or air-based platform. 
Consequently, we do not consider surface or air assets in this specific scenario. An 
underwater sensor detection grid with a deployable munition (Blue UUV) provides a higher 
degree of protection against an underwater covert attack by Red UUVs. Figure 58 shows 
an area of coverage where a sensor field is monitoring a swath of the ocean in the general 
area containing undersea infrastructure, with additional sensors deployed around specific 
oil platforms. The outer barrier and second barrier around the oil rig represent multiple 
layers of sensors which may or may not be stationed in this manner.  With that said, this 
scenario will be modeled by Blue forces consisting of a defensive sensor network that can 
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deploy Blue UUVs from UUV docking stations or “pods” that will intercept and counter 
the Red UUVs. 
2. Scope 
This model represents a very small portion of the Gulf of Mexico and is intended 
to represent a single enemy Red UUV against a defensive system defending a single oil 
platform as shown in Figure 59. The oil platform is in the top of Figure 59 and Red 
approaches from the bottom. Red must traverse through a sensor field, represented by + 
signs in Figure 59. If a sensor detects Red, then interdiction UUVs are deployed from the 
pod slightly north of the field to intercept and destroy the Red threat. The oil field network 
in the Gulf of Mexico extends hundreds of kilometers long, with varying distances from 
the U.S. coastline. This model will only examine a 20-kilometer swath of the Gulf of 
Mexico with a single Red UUVs inbound to a single oil platform defended by a defensive 
network. 
 
 Scope of Scenario 
The technology to detect, track, engage, and kill a Red UUV is available today and 
will be more advanced in the 2030 timeframe. The modeled defensive network was 
conceived based on how these current technologies work today. For detection technology, 
acoustic sensors are primarily used. There are many different types of acoustic sensors and 
ways to deploy them. For instance, we know that an underwater sensor can listen / detect 
noise in a spherical manner depending on placement in the ocean. For example if the sensor 
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is placed on the ocean bottom it will get a half sphere of detection, but if the sensor is 
tethered and suspended in the water column it can establish a full sphere of detection. This 
report uses more general terms such as “sensor” instead of something specific like “passive 
hydrophone” to avoid presenting an unnecessarily limited defensive system. 
Communication between sensors and the transmission of data to oil platforms, 
shore-based facility, and UUVs is an important part of an undersea defensive network. 
Such communication can be accomplished in a variety of ways such as underwater 
transmitters, cabled communications, tethered transmitting buoys, and wire guided UUVs. 
For this reason, the model is set up so that the sensors communicate the position of a Red 
UUV to Blue interdiction UUVs. Underwater detection by UUVs is also possible today, 
and thus the Blue UUVs are given a short-range organic detection sensor for localization 
of the Red UUV. Destruction of the Red UUV can only be achieved by the Blue UUV, and 
for modeling purposes, we view the Blue UUV functioning like a torpedo in which it has 
to close within a certain distance of the Red UUV to achieve destruction. If the Blue UUV 
ever loses track of the Red UUV (e.g., because the Red UUV left the sensor field), the Blue 
UUV will terminate its pursuit.  
The paragraphs above show how we have scoped this problem and how it is 
possible to model the system and implement a simulation in an environment such as 
MANA. The model includes a stationary underwater sensor field with Blue UUVs as the 
defensive munition protecting an oil rig from and inbound Red UUV. The objective of this 
model is to determine the probability of kill for one Red UUV against a defensive system 
protecting an oil platform. This model is built on four principal agents: the Red UUV, Blue 
UUV, Blue sensor, and the Blue platform. The characteristics of these agents will be varied 
to determine which type of defensive setup is necessary in defending the platform. 
3. Assumptions 
Based on UUV and Sensor characteristics previously discussed, certain 
assumptions and conclusions are made to build a realistic MANA model.  
- Red UUV is fire and forget (a one-time use weapon not intended to    
survive or return) 
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- Red UUV is modeled at 10kph (5.4kt) 
- Red UUV knows the location of the Oil platform 
- One platform will be protected by a 20km linear barrier of sensors 
- Each sensor has a maximum detection radius of 1000m 
- Each sensor has the same Gaussian detection characteristics where the 
sensor has a probability of detection of 0.5 at 500m. 
4. MANA Implementation Details 
This section provides information about the simulation implementation in MANA. 
It primarily defines the key variables examined. 
a. Initial setup 
To build this scenario in MANA, every aspect of every agent is explored. Figure 
60 is one defensive representation in which a 20-kilometer swath of water has 40 sensors 
equally spaced 1000 meters apart in two rows and three Blue stationary UUV pods are 
equally spaced. The UUV hold Blue UUVs that launch when the Red UUV is detected by 
the sensor network. We randomly generate the initial position of the Blue platform and Red 
UUV on either side of the sensor field.  
 
 
 MANA Implementation of Scenario 
Several parameters are varied in our analysis to determine their impact on the 
success probability. These include the number of UUV Pods, spacing of sensors, 
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characteristics of the Blue UUV (such as speed), and number of rows of sensors.  Exploring 
these model parameters allows for the determination of a base case that can yield valuable 
results.  
b. Sensor Field 
A sensor’s detection capabilities with respect to distances are normally distributed 
and have a probability of detection of 0.5 at 500 meters. At zero meters from the sensor the 
probability of detection is one, and the detection probability drops off the further a target 
is from the sensor according to Figure 61.  
 
 MANA Sensor Characteristics 
The yellow circle in Figure 60 represents the sensor coverage of one sensor. The 
radius of the yellow circle is 1000 meters (which is double the 0.5 detection probability 
radius). This sensor field is constructed so that the distance between sensors is 1000 meters 
and there is significant overlap in the sensor footprints.  
The sensor overlap increases the overall detection probability of a threat at every 
range. For example, if the threat is 400 meters from Sensor A, sensor A will detect with 
probability of 0.631. However, if the threat is also 600 meters away from adjacent Sensor 
B, then the overall detection probability is 0.767 = 1-(1-0.631) *(1-0.369). We next explore 
the importance of this overlap. 
Assume the two circles in Figure 62  represent two sensors. As the circles move 
away from each other, the overlap degrades, and the combined sensor advantage is reduced. 
Of course more overlap requires more sensors and more cost. 
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 Significant Overlapping Sensors 
Though the probability of detection is increased by having overlapping sensors, 
detection and interception of a Red UUV is more likely to occur if the Red UUV spends 
more time in the sensor network. We assume the sensors have an independent detection 
opportunity every second. Even a cookie cutter sensor with only 0.25 detection probability 
would detect a threat with 0.95 probability after 11 seconds in the sensor footprint (1-(1-
0.25)11).  
Without significant overlap, there will be quasi gaps where a threat could traverse 
between two sensors and spend little to no time in the sensor field. Figure 63 illustrates an 
extreme example where two sensors are spaced so the footprints barely touch. If a threat 
traversed right between the two sensors, it would be nearly impossible to detect it. 
 
 Non-Overlapping Sensors 
Having overlapping sensors significantly increases the probability of detection and 
interception due to the amount of time a Red UUV spends in the sensor field or network. 
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In a two-row sensor network of overlapping sensors, the effective configuration to counter 
a threat approaching from any direction could look like Figure 64. 
 
 
 Two Rows of Overlapping Sensors 
In our case we know a threat would approach from south to north, and thus we only 
need to overlap east to west as shown Figure 65. 
 
 
 Two Row Staggered Sensors 
Overlapping sensors not only provide enhanced detection capabilities, they also 
transmit tracking information to the interdiction UUV for a longer period of time. In Figure 
62, a Red UUV would have to traverse over 1700 m in a one row field based on sufficient 
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overlap. This number comes from the intersection of two circles. A Red UUV capable of 
traveling at 9.2 kph (5kt), traverses 1700 m in slightly more than 11 minutes. The 
interdiction UUV must arrive to the Red UUV within this time, or else the system will lose 
track or the Red UUV. With two rows of overlapping sensors as in Figure 65, the 
interdiction UUV has over 22 minutes to respond. In the implementation when there are 
two sensor rows, we allow the overlap to vary between the situation illustrated in Figure 
64 (which corresponds to a total sensor field width of 3000m) and the situation illustrated 
in Figure 65 (which corresponds to a total sensor field width of 4000m). 
The MANA models created for this scenario only consider one or two rows of 
sensors. We found that having more than two rows of sensors did not provide much 
additional benefit; improving interdiction speed and sensor characteristics made a greater 
difference. More details appear in the analysis section. 
c. Number of Blue UUVs 
We next turn to the remaining parameters we vary in the model. The number of 
Blue UUV pods varied from three to six in the analysis. We chose a minimum of three 
because the preliminary analysis using only one or two pods produced a success probability 
of less than 0.5. Using three pods the probability increased to 0.8. Even though a 0.8 
success probability is lower than most commanders would want, other factors such as Blue 
UUV speed, weapons range, and communications latency can push the success probability 
even higher. The number of UUVs in each pod varies from 1 to 6. When the sensor field 
detects a threat and communicates that back to the pod, all UUVs in the pod are deployed 
to hunt for the threat. The number of UUVs per pod has a negligible impact on the results 
for this model because there is only one threat. However, it is important to consider systems 
that include multiple UUVs per pod to counter more sophisticated attacks such as swarms. 
One such swarm scenario appears in Chapter Five. 
d. Starting point of Red UUV and Blue platform 
The model assumes the Red UUV has been launched and is traveling toward the 
platform. Since the location of oil rigs are known in the Gulf of Mexico the Red UUV 
already has the coordinates and is using onboard navigation to arrive at those coordinates. 
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The initial point (called spawn point) where the Red UUV enters the area of interest near 
the sensor field is uniformly generated. Similarly, the spawn point for the oil platform is 
uniformly generated on the opposite side near the pods. The randomness of the spawn 
points adds to the realism of the model because in practice the angle of approach will be 
unknown. Given the attack is covert in nature, we assume the Red UUV will move slowly 
and as quietly as possible directly from its launch point towards the oil platform with no 
type of deception or sprinting.  
e. Interaction between sensor field and Blue UUVs 
The Red UUV enters the defensive sensor network at the start of scenario and the 
Blue UUVs are not deployed until the sensor field detects the threat and communicates the 
information back to the Blue UUVs. Figure 66 demonstrates which Blue sensors interact 
with which Blue UUV. 
  
 UUV and Sensor Communication 
In each MANA model, the Blue sensors communicate with the Blue UUVs to 
transmit the Red UUV’s location as shown in Figure 66. Each UUV only communicates 
with sensors in its designed area because that is where interception is possible. The 
interception UUVs in lane 1 could not possibly intercept a Red UUV in lane 3 before the 
Red UUV finishes traversing the sensor field. Recall that interception must occur in (or 
very close to) the sensor field. Once the threat leaves the sensor field, it will be very 
difficult for a Blue UUV to detect the Red UUV again with its own organic sensors.   
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Communication between the sensor field and Blue UUVs is not perfect. We define 
a communications reliability percentage in the model that tracks the probability each 
message is successfully transmitted. The communications reliability varies between 90 to 
100 percent. Furthermore, there can be delays in the transmission of a message from the 
Blue sensor to the Blue UUV. This sensor latency was varied from zero to ten seconds  
The vertical distance between the location of a Blue UUV pod and the sensor field 
is a parameter we also vary in the model. This distance ranges from 1 to 3 kilometers. 
f. UUV Characteristics 
The Blue and Red UUV characteristics were modeled based on the information provided 
in Chapter II.   The remaining Blue UUV parameters are organic sensor range of a UUV, 
UUV organic sensor aperture angle, UUV speed, and weapons range. The UUVs speed 
varies from 10 to 25 kph.  The Blue UUV sensor aperture is part of the organic sensor 
onboard the Blue UUV and is varied from 90 to 180 degrees; this was to analyze the effects 
of the UUVs’ field of view while closing in on the Red UUV. The Blue UUV organic 
sensor range is varies from 50 to 200 meters. Finally, the warhead blast range of the Blue 




 Varied UUV Characteristics 
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g. Summary 
The parameters described in the last several subsections appear in Table 19.       
5. Design of Experiments 
A design of experiments approach was used to vary the parameters described in the 
previous section. A nearly orthogonal latin hypercube (NOLH) design was used, and a 
sample of the design points appear in in Table 19. Our measure of effectiveness is the 
probability of Blue mission success; that is will Blue be able to successfully kill Red before 
Red reaches the defended objective. The underlying assumption is that considerable 
damage will be inflicted on the defended objective once the Red UUV reaches it. The 
NOLH model generated 260 design points for exploration.  
 
Table 19 Performance Effects Parameters 
S/No. Parameter Mini value Max value 
1 Number of docking stations 3 6 
2 Blue UUV Sensor Aperture (field of view in degrees) 90 180 
3 Blue UUV Sensor range (meters) 50 200 
4 Number of Blue UUVs per docking station 1 6 
5 Blue UUV speed (km/hour) 10 25 
6 Number of sensor layers 1 2 
7 Communications reliability (%) 90 100 
8 Sensor latency (sec) 0 10 
9 Distance of docking station from sensor layer (km) 1 3 
10 Sensor layer width (km) 3 4 
11 Warhead blast range (m) 2 10 
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42 of the 260 design points performed exceptionally well, producing Blue success 
in all simulation runs. The details of these 42 design points appear in Table 20.  
The next section describes the analysis performed on the 260 data points from the 
design. This analysis generates insights on the influencing factors that lead to good 
performance of the system.  
 



































6 177 153 3 21 90 3 1156 3375 8 2
6 143 200 5 16 97 5 1844 3219 10 2
6 169 148 6 23 97 6 1187 3672 8 2
6 158 144 2 25 98 2 1719 3359 6 2
6 134 198 1 17 98 6 1625 3313 10 2
6 105 170 4 24 90 6 1031 3297 8 2
6 132 62 5 18 98 3 1281 3141 4 2
6 108 76 6 23 95 3 1969 3109 9 2
6 150 137 4 21 91 10 1000 3563 6 2
6 114 141 3 21 92 1 1062 3594 6 2
6 149 69 5 18 100 4 1469 3766 9 2
6 94 92 5 19 97 8 2094 3250 5 2
6 125 90 2 24 95 8 1875 3828 4 2
6 146 88 1 19 98 7 1125 3156 4 2
6 100 146 1 22 97 1 1312 3547 7 2
6 122 66 2 18 99 6 1531 3734 9 2
6 152 55 1 22 94 6 2219 3094 9 2
6 174 95 2 19 96 2 2187 3078 5 2
6 111 172 3 25 98 7 2781 3578 9 2
6 160 132 3 23 93 10 2906 3000 7 2
6 141 179 2 15 96 5 1344 3797 6 2
6 139 83 3 20 94 5 2625 3281 10 2
6 103 134 4 23 93 0 2562 3031 6 2
6 172 177 4 22 99 3 2750 3656 8 2
6 179 127 4 24 92 1 2250 3813 5 2
6 135 125 4 18 95 5 2000 3500 7 2
6 115 193 4 20 99 2 2594 3516 3 2
6 142 99 5 24 94 2 2062 3938 4 2
6 138 188 2 17 92 7 2719 3859 9 2
6 107 85 1 20 96 1 2406 3984 8 2
6 127 50 2 19 93 5 2156 3781 3 2
3 107 85 1 20 96 1 1031 3297 8 2
3 172 177 4 22 99 3 1687 3125 8 2
3 166 64 5 22 95 9 1094 3328 8 2
3 179 127 4 24 92 1 1375 3375 5 2
3 115 193 4 20 99 2 1969 3203 3 2
3 139 83 3 20 94 5 2437 3188 10 2
3 97 130 5 25 99 8 2219 3750 6 2
3 103 134 4 23 93 0 2937 3219 6 2
3 125 90 2 24 95 8 1344 3563 4 2
3 142 99 5 24 94 2 1125 3469 4 2
3 100 146 1 22 97 1 1906 3844 7 2
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6. Results 
We first examine the impact of the number of sensor layers. The sensors provide 
the initial detection of Red. However as discussed previously the sensor field plays another 
critical role: by constantly tracking Red and communicating Red’s position to Blue UUVs, 
the sensor field provides Blue with the ability to effectively respond to the threat over a 
period of time. The more layers in the sensor field, the more time Blue has responds. The 
decision tree shown in Figure 68 illustrates the impact of one vs. two sensor layers. Over 
all 260 design points, the success probability is 0.46. When we consider the 130 design 
points with two layers of sensors, the success probability significantly improves to 0.78. 
Furthermore, the 42 design points shown in Table 20 that generate success in all simulation 
runs all had a configuration with 2-layers of sensors. The single layer design points perform 
poorly: the average success probability is 0.15. This leads to the conclusion that a single 
sensor layer in this concept of operations will not be effective. Therefore, the remaining 
analysis will focus on 2-layer sensor design point.  
 
 
 1st Sub-branch of the Decision Tree 
a. Stepwise Regression Control and Least Mean Squares  
The next step is to perform a stepwise linear regression analysis using the 11 
independent variables Table 19 as input, except for the sensor layout. This produces a 
dataset with 130 points. We include main effects and two two-way interactions in our 
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model. The dependent variable is the success probability. The significance level for the 
analysis is α = 0.05. 
Figure 69 presents the coefficients ranked in order of statistical significant. It gives 
a plot of the LogWorth (defined as -log10(p-value)) values for the effects in the model. The 
LogWorth transformation adjusts p-values to provide an appropriate scale for graphing 
purposes. The vertical blue line in the bar chart represents the threshold for significance at 
the α =0.05. This figure shows that Blue UUV speed, number of pods (i.e., docking 
stations) and distance between the pods and the sensor field are statistically significant 
parameters.  
 
 Summary of Significant Factors and Two-way Interactions 
on P(Success) 
b. Main Effects Profiler 
We next present a profiler plot, which illustrates how the success probability 
changes as we vary one parameter at a time; the remaining parameters are fixed at their 
mean values. The team observed that the Blue UUV speed and distance between Blue Pod 
and sensor field have an operationally significant impact on the results. Note these 
relationships have diminishing returns. The number of pods and UUV sensor range have a 
slight operational impact.  
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 Main Effects Plot 
Effects from speed of Blue UUV. The probability of success increases with the 
Blue UUV speed. With greater speed, the Blue UUV will have a higher chance of 
intercepting the Red UUV. However, it is important to note that relationship is increasing 
at a decreasing rate. This implies that at high values of UUV speed, the investment into 
UUV speed will not yield as significant an impact as the initial improvements. The insight 
here is that Blue needs sufficient speed to get into position in the sensor field to intercept 
Red before Red leaves the sensor field. Having additional speed beyond this level, does 
not provide additional benefit.  
Effects of distance of Blue Pods from Sensor field. As the distance between the 
Blue UUV docking stations (pods) and the sensor field increases, the probability of success 
decreases. This longer distance translates to a longer travel time for Blue to reach the sensor 
field. If Blue does not reach the sensor field by the time Red leaves the field, Blue will 
have very little opportunity to reacquire Red with Blue’s own organic sensors. The 
implication is the same as speed: the faster Blue can arrive to the sensor field in effective 
intercepting position, the better 
Effects of Number of Pods: the more pods, the better Blue performs, although the 
relationship is small compared to the prior two variables. The number of pods has a similar 
impact as the distance from pods to sensor field. The more pods there are, the less pipeline 
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each pods is responsible for, and the easier it is for Blue UUVs to reach the pipeline before 
Red leaves the sensor field. 
Effects of Blue UUV Sensor Range: as with the number of pods, Blue UUV sensor 
range has a small positive impact on   success probability. UUV sensor range is important 
for two reasons. First, it allows Blue to potentially detect and localize the threat after the 
Red UUV has left the sensor field. Second, even if Red is still in the sensor field, Blue has 
a greater margin for error in where it needs to position itself when it arrives to sensor field 
to successfully intercept Red. 
c. Decision Tree Analysis 
Based on the importance of speed, distance between pod and sensor field, number 
of pods, and UUV sensor range, we create a decision tree to further examine their impact 
on mission success. Recall this analysis assumes two layers of sensors. Figure 71 further 
confirms the importance of Blue UUV speed. When the speed is less than 12 kph, the 
probability of mission success drops from 0.78 to 0.22. When speed is 17 kph or greater, 
the probability of success increases from 0.78 to 0.96 At the bottom of the tree, we see the 
other factors can make a nontrivial impact. At moderate speeds, having more pods and/or 
deceasing the range from the pods to the sensor field can make a significant impact. At 
very slow speeds a larger blast radius can increase the success probability by nearly 0.3. 
This highlights that decision makers should focus most of their efforts and resources into 
improving the UUV speed. After that they should take measures to reduce the distance 
from the pod to the sensor in the most cost-effective manner: either adding more pods, or 
placing the pods closer to the sensor field. 
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 Decision Tree Analysis on Factors of Significance. 
Clearly Blue UUV speed is the most important factor. However, our last analysis 
examines a tradeoff of speed vs. number of UUVs. In reality, it might be more realistic or 
cost effective to deploy more, slower UUVs than fewer, faster UUVs. The number of pods 
is proportional to the number of UUVs and hence is our proxy for number of UUVs. Figure 
72 displays a contour profile based on predicted probability of success from the regression 
model. We fix all parameters except for Blue speed and number of Pods. We then examine 
the combination of those two parameters that produce a success probability of 0.99 (red 
envelope). The plot shows that an increase in the number of docking stations can reduce 
the Blue UUV speed requirements. A feasible design point exists even for the low-end 
scenario where only 1 docking station is modelled within the defended area. Hence, having 
a speed advantage can compensate for a reduction in dispersion of Blue UUV forces. The 
analysis is predicated on a 2-layer sensor field and a nominal Blue UUV speed of 
approximately 21kph. The plot also illustrates that even with a significant number of 
UUVs, there still is a relatively high floor on the speed required (over 17kph with 6 pods).  
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 Contour Profile Plot for Blue UUV Speed and # of Pods 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
In conclusion, there is need for a dense effective sensor field that can detect, 
localize, and track the threat and guide the interceptor. It is also important for the 
interceptor be able to effectively navigate into position to destroy the threat. Speed is the 
most effective way for Blue to reach the sensor field quickly, although increasing the 
number of pods and positioning the pods closer to the sensor field also make a positive 
impact. We recommend At least 3 UUV pods be deployed in a 20km frontage to defend 
against a single Red UUV attack. Table 21 summarizes the recommendations. 
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Table 21 Summary of Recommendations 
Factors Observations Recommendations 
Blue UUV 
Speed 
A speed advantage over adversary 
UUV is required for mission success. 




Given an assumed detection range of 
1km, a minimum of 2 layers are 
required for mission success. 
A 3km-wide sensor field comprising 2 
parallel layers of sensors is 
recommended. 
# of Pods 
A minimum of 3 Pods (docking 
station) are required. 
The recommendation is to increase the 
number of docking stations or capacity 
of pods for future expansion of 
infrastructure defense capability. 
# of UUV 
A minimum of 1 UUV per Pod is 
required to defend an area spanning 
20km in length. 
Requirements can be extrapolated to 
meet other Red CONOPS. 
Sensor 
overlap 
Increasing sensor overlap, increases 
the probability of success. 
The recommendation is to achieve 
100% overlap, i.e., adjacent sensor 
layers are placed apart at a distance 
equal to their maximum range. 
 
C. MODEL 2: THEATER-WIDE DEFENSE IN DEPTH 
1. Scenario 
The layout of the region with an overview of the locations of pipelines and proposed 
defense barriers is shown in Figure 73. 
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 Gulf of Mexico Pipelines 
While Model 1 examined the barrier defense concept to determine feasibility for 
defeating UUV attempting to enter a restricted area, Model 2 examines the problem from 
a theater wide view, focusing on a larger range of threats that might present themselves 
and incorporating variations of defense in depth to determine how they might be dealt with. 
The lower fidelity nature of the individual unit interactions in a model of such large 
scale requires the analyst to look beyond the technical feasibility of some aspects of the 
model design. In certain cases, feasibility issues are examined and the rationale for using 
the model configuration chosen is explained in more detail. The intended effect is to allow 
the analyst and decision maker to look beyond the proverbial trees so as to try and get a 
sense of the forest. This will admittedly have an effect on the cost estimation and model 
analysis in later chapters, and so should be considered when discussing the level of 
accuracy of the model’s results. 
a. Defending Assets 
The scenario model is based around the defense of 100 key infrastructure nodes 
within an area which encompasses the bulk of the Gulf of Mexico’s underwater 
infrastructure. The decision to focus on key nodes rather than the full extent of 
infrastructure in the region is based on several points.  
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First, from a practical standpoint there is too much infrastructure to possibly fit in 
a single model, especially once the tens of thousands of miles of pipeline are added to the 
thousands of potential platform targets. Second, the alternative to focusing on a limited 
number of target nodes would be to count threat units that navigate successfully into the 
threat area as a successful attack; this is an imprecise measure of attack success as it fails 
to allow for the possibility that attackers would be defeated by point defense or area defense 
weapons operating within the threat area. Thirdly, based on analysis previously explored 
in chapters two, this model assumes that attacking forces would most likely focus on 
attacking high priority nodes which are more limited in number and would be uniquely 
damaging to the environment or economy. These nodes may or may not be known by the 
defender, and as such the defender may or may not be able to incorporate point defense at 
the nodes; both possibilities are included in the model. 
b. Defending Assets: Overview 
To defend these nodes, the model analyzes the use of different combinations of 
Blue platforms to defeat attacking enemy forces. This range of delivery platforms allows 
for examination of a broad spectrum of defensive approaches, varying from the singular 
method of point defense of critical nodes to more holistic approaches involving multiple 
layers of defense in depth.  
Blue assets can be broken into three categories; point, barrier, and area defense. 
Point defense is defined as an attempt to protect a singular position from a threat. Barrier 
defense is an attempt to maintain some sort of security perimeter so as to ensure that any 
position inside the region of the barrier is protected to a larger degree than one outside it. 
Area defense shares with Barrier defense the same goal of improving the security of various 
positions within region, but is differentiated by the fact that it is not limited to activity 
within the confines of specified barriers.  
c. Defending Assets: Weapons 
The weapon of choice for engaging adversary forces underwater is an idealized 
Blue UUV, which is represented in the model in the form of a line-of-sight kinetic weapon 
fired from a range of platforms. This Blue UUV is theoretically similar to a torpedo, with 
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a range upwards of 10km and is capable of both organic and inorganic target acquisition 
and guidance. The platforms capable of firing this weapon include underwater UUV 
docking stations arranged in either point defense or barrier defense schemes, as well as 
ships and aircraft which perform area defense patrols. Of note, the actual execution details 
of a UUV intercept against a threat would be different than the way this model presents it; 
Model 1 provides a more accurate assessment of how such an engagement might take place. 
From a theater wide perspective, this inconsistency can be overlooked as modeling a 
torpedo-like engagement at this large scale is impractical given the technical constraints of 
the modeling program, hence the use of the line-of-sight kinetic weapon.  
The weapon of choice for engaging adversary forces on the surface is the Blue 
surface ship boarding team. The selection of the surface ship as the sole means of stopping 
enemy surface forces is based on several considerations. First, the model assumes that, 
given the amount of civilian traffic in the Gulf of Mexico, it is imperative that Blue forces 
are able to visually assess a surface contact as being a hostile contact. Second, the model 
assumes that all aircraft and underwater nodes (defended assets) are armed solely with Blue 
UUV so as to maximize their ability to counter enemy UUV threats operating in large 
numbers. Third, we have selected physical boarding of the threat ship as the means of 
stopping an enemy surface ship. This is based on a realization that the political risks 
associated with attacking a critical contact of interest with lethal force without having first 
proved outright hostile intent is too high. Of the units involved in the model, only Blue 
surface ships have the capacity to perform this role. They do so without the aid of helicopter 
based boarding teams since that is a specialized mission set that is not typically included 
on most surface vessels.  
d. Defending Assets: Sensing and Targeting 
In order to prosecute engagements, a variety of sensor equipment is utilized by Blue 
platforms. Surface ships were assigned surface sensing ranges out to 20km and subsurface 
sensing ranges out to 1km. Aircraft were assigned 100km surface sensing ranges and 100m 
subsurface ranges (this 100m subsurface range was required as a work around within 
MANA software because aircraft were otherwise unable to fire on subsurface contacts 
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provided by other defending assets, a critical component of this model). The point defense 
underwater sensor had a subsurface detection range of 2km and the underwater docking 
stations had detection ranges varying from 500 to 1500m.  
Of note, the model assumes that all sensors utilize a step-function approximation to 
the lateral range curve, also known as “cookie cutter” methodology to establish sensor 
range or “sweep width.” This means that all areas within the sensor range have equal 
probability of detection, as opposed to a distribution-based methodology in which 
probability of detection would increase or decrease depending on exact distance to the 
sensor node. Using the “cookie cutter” methodology is commonplace in naval operations 
analysis.  
Another major characteristic of the sensors is that the model assumes that all 
sensors have communication with the all other assets, and once a sensor detects a threat 
UUV it is able to send fire control quality targeting information to a Blue Force asset which 
can then deploy a weapon to neutralize the threat. The assumption made here is that once 
the Blue UUV has been launched, it will continue to attempt to interdict the target utilizing 
organic targeting systems even if the original detection platform has lost contact.  
e. Enemy Threats 
While there is a wide array of threats that could potentially exploit underwater oil 
and gas infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, they can be generally broken down into four 
categories, only three of which can be adequately modeled for the purposes of this project. 
The first threat is an underwater asset that is able to travel long distances under its own 
power and attack a singular position without coordinating with any other units. This has 
been termed the “Lone Wolf UUV” for the purposes of this model, but it serves to represent 
any type of underwater vehicle with a similar concept of operations. The second threat is a 
Deceptor Cargo Ship capable of carrying multiple UUVs within close proximity of its 
intended target before launching them. This enables the UUVs to bypass the majority of 
the barrier and area defenses that the Lone Wolf UUVs would have had to pass through. 
The third threat is a “Bomber Ship,” which represents any surface vessel that might directly 
attack the underwater targets, either by dropping explosives on top of the target or by 
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dropping or dragging an anchor to cause damage. The low number of Deceptor Cargo Ships 
and Bomber Ships incorporated in the model reflects the assumption that these attacks 
would be carried out by large and expensive cargo ships, for which the logistical costs of 
acquiring and operating more than a few would be prohibitive for most potential 
adversaries. 
It is worth noting that hostile aircraft would be able to perform the second and third 
threat roles to varying degrees of success. The reasons that they were not included is several 
fold. First, the level of threat these aircraft would be able to present is generally lower 
because of the payload limitations associated with aircraft, especially considering the size 
and weight of the UUV or explosives that would most likely be required to accomplish 
these missions. Second, the existence of an Air Defense Identification Zone around the 
United States, and its ensuing air superiority capabilities, already provides some level of 
defense against such an attack. Finally, the effects of cargo or bomber aircraft can be 
presumed to correlate at least approximately with the effects of Deceptor Cargo Ships or 
Bomber Ships. 
 The fourth threat category is the insider threat. This could be anything 
ranging from a disgruntled employee with access to key control subsystems or weak points, 
cyber attackers who manipulate those targets remotely, or saboteurs who force entry to 
targets. In any case, data surrounding those activities is scarce and as such they cannot be 
adequately modeled in MANA with any degree of accuracy. 
f. Enemy’s Intended Outcome 
The intended enemy outcome is the destruction of as many infrastructure nodes as 
possible. During each run, the number of nodes destroyed is tracked. By analyzing the 
casualty rates for infrastructure nodes against a wide combination of defenses and threats, 
the model may aid in the identification of trends that might provide valuable insights for 
future decision makers. Two primary models were developed—one which looks at the 




2. Factor Selection and MANA Implementation 
The combinations of defenses and threats vary according to a total of 14 factors that 
were varied between high and low extremes through a large number of trials. Of these 14 
factors, 8 were attributed to Blue Forces and 6 to Enemy Forces. These factors will now be 
discussed in further detail, a full list is shown below in Table 22. 
 




























1  Weapon Pk  0.5  0.8 
2  Number of  Blue  Ships  2  20 
3  Number of Weapons per Ship  8  20 
4  Number of P‐8 Airborne  1  7 
5  Number of Weapons per P‐8  2  6 







9  Speed of Threat UUV (kph)  4  20 
10  Number  of  Threat Deceptor  Cargo 
Ships  
0 (1) *  5 
11  Number  of  Threat UUVs  per 
Deceptor Cargo Ship 
1   5 
12  Number of Lone Wolf UUV  1  30 
13  Number of Threat Bomber Ships  1  5 
14  Speed of Bomber Ship (kph)  10  37 
*MANA Limitation, explained in Deceptor Cargo 
Ship Section Below 
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a. Blue Weapon Pk 
All the Blue assets incorporated in this scenario use Blue UUVs as the weapon to 
kill the Threat UUVs. The first factor was the Pk of Blue Force weapons. The Pk ranged 
from 0.5–0.8. Blue Weapon Pk for surface ships against enemy surface ships is set at 1.0, 
based on the assumption that once the boarding team has embarked the target they will 
successfully stop it. 
b. Blue Surface Ship #s 
The surface ships utilized are not class specific. Any ship capable of achieving a 
cruising speed of 40 kph that could be outfitted with sonar and a means to deploy Blue 
Force UUVs could be used. This includes Navy DDG, LCS, and the Coast Guard National 
Security Cutter (NSC). These ships are responsible for conducting area searches to detect 
threat UUVs, looking for suspicious surface vessels to board, and responding to detections 
made by other units. The surface ships are placed on random patrols in the Gulf of Mexico 
between Cuba and the pipelines targets, and are designed to look for surface and subsurface 
threats and to respond to threats identified by Blue sensor systems including air and 
subsurface sensors. Once a UUV threat is detected either organically or inorganically, ships 
can launch Blue UUVs to destroy the attacker. The number of ships used in the model 
ranged from a minimum of 2 ships to a maximum of 20.  
c. Blue surface ship ammunition 
Each of these ships carried 8–20 UUVs for intercepting enemy UUVs and unlimited 
ammunition for intercepting enemy surface vessels. 
d. Blue Aircraft # 
 The P-8 Poseidon is the air asset of choice for our scenario because of its 
subsurface capabilities, on station time, cargo capacity, cruising speed, and general fleet 
availability. The P8s in the model are assigned to various patrol patterns from which they 
can break away to respond to enemy UUV threats detected by point and barrier defense 
sensors and Blue ships. When they are within range, they launch their Blue UUVs to attack 
the enemy UUV.  
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e. Blue Aircraft Ammunition # 
The amount of ammunition available to each P8 ranged from 2 to 6 UUVs 
interceptors. They are not outfitted with any air to surface weapons and as such cannot 
target any enemy shipping. This is an acknowledged weak point of the model in that any 
theater commander anticipating a surface ship threat would very likely order the P8 or any 
other available assets to include air to surface weapons to its weapons payload. Even so, 
this model is designed to be optimized against underwater threats and the assumption 
moving forward is that intelligence about the surface threat doesn’t exist in time for the P8 
to change its payload. 
f. Blue Underwater Sensors: Detection Range 
The model examines the effectiveness of point defense and barrier defense sensors 
of varying ranges. The point defense sensors are assigned to each Blue target node and the 
barrier defenses are arranged in two lines of sensors. One ran from west to east for 
approximately 194 KM and a second south to north for a distance of 155 KM. For the 
purposes of our model, sensors are arranged along the barrier in a configuration that 
produces an effect similar to the barrier investigated in GM Model 1. The detection range 
of the individual defensive sensors varies between 500–1500 m as a variable for model 
analysis. These sensors provide initial targeting information for the Blue UUV that are 
housed by the UUV docking stations. Collectively, they are represented by the green lines 
in Figure 74. 
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 Gulf of Mexico Pipeline Sensor Fields and UUV Docking 
Stations  
g. Blue Underwater Barrier Docking Station:  Number of defensive UUV  
In addition to the sensors, the barrier also has UUV docking stations which are 
placed every 20 km along the barrier. These are represented by the blue (+) symbols in 
Figure 70. Each docking station has between 2 and 6 Blue UUVs, each of which is able to 
intercept an incoming enemy UUV once a preliminary detection is made by one of sensors 
in the barrier. This interception is simulated by a kinetic weapon that fires at the target 
detected by a sensor with a probability of kill based on the previously described Weapon 
Pk. The UUV docking stations are programmed with a short delay in between each 
attempted intercept to ensure time for the Blue forces to evaluate the effectiveness of each 
salvo prior to firing a follow-on salvo. 
h. Blue Underwater Point Defense Docking Station:  Number of Defensive 
UUV 
In the point defense, each node has a docking station that has between 2 and 6 Blue 
UUVs. This interception is simulated by a kinetic weapon that fires at the target detected 
by a sensor with a probability of kill based on the previously described Weapon Pk.  
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i. Enemy UUV Speed 
The model treats each threat UUV as a MDUUV similar to the ones previously used 
by the Blue forces in NB Model 1. The first factor varied was their speed, which is the 
same for the Lone Wolf UUV as well as for those deployed by Deceptor Cargo Ships. This 
ranged from 4–20 kph.  
j. Number of Lone Wolf UUV 
The next factor was the number of Lone Wolf UUV, ranging from 1 to 30. Each 
threat UUV carries 3 small torpedoes and is capable of detonating itself against a target, 
meaning that each threat UUV is capable of killing four targets with a 100% probability of 
success per attack. 
k. Number of Deceptor Cargo Ships 
The number of Deceptor Cargo Ships secretly carrying threat UUVs ranged from 0 
to 5. For the purposes of this model, there is no forewarning of their arrival and so they 
cannot be intercepted by Blue Surface Craft. This represents the fact that they are able to 
unload their UUV without suspiciously departing from the traffic lanes, as is described in 
Model 1. The key difference from Model 1 is that they do so after having already sailed 
past the sensor barrier.  
l. Number of UUV Per Deceptor Cargo Ship 
The number of threat UUVs secretly carried onboard each Deceptor Cargo Ship is 
varied from 0 to 5. Obviously this parameter is only relevant if there are a positive number 
of cargo ships. The total number of threat Deceptor UUVs across all cargo ships varies 
between 1 and 25. These UUVs have the same design specifications as the Lone Wolf 
UUV.  
m. Number of Bomber Ships 
The number of Bomber ships utilized varies from 1 to 5 Bomber Ships. In this 
scenario, they differ from the Deceptor Cargo Ships because Bomber Ships can be detected 
and boarded by Blue surface ships at any time. This is done to simulate the fact that certain 
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flagged vessels may be designated as Contacts of Interest that must be boarded and 
inspected prior to passing within a certain distance of key infrastructure points, and others 
may be flagged as suspicious when they depart from commercial shipping lanes. Another 
key difference is that the Bomber Ships must sail directly over the infrastructure they are 
targeting, whereas the Deceptor Cargo Ships can deploy the UUVs from a less suspicious 
distance.  
n. Speed of Bomber Ships 
The speed of the Bomber Ships in the model ranges from 10 to 37 kph.  
o. Additional Assumptions: Bomber Ship Weapon 
The amount of ammunition carried onboard the Bomber Ships is unlimited, 
allowing the Bomber Ship to proceed from target to target indefinitely until stopped by a 
defending surface ship. This is done to highlight the fact that even crude attacks such as an 
anchor drop can be extremely effective if not physically prevented by defending forces, as 
well as to illustrate the fact that oftentimes critical infrastructure is closely spaced and a 
single or small group of attackers could do inordinate amounts of damage to those clusters 
of targets. 
p. Additional Assumptions: UUV Fuel/Battery Life 
In order to model UUV Fuel/Battery Life, the model is based on a stop time 
condition of approximately 24 hours. This stop time condition ensures that even if enemy 
UUV have evaded defending units, if they take too long to reach their intended targets they 
will still be counted as unsuccessful attacks. This stop condition holds true for both Lone 
Wolf UUV and UUV deployed from the Deceptor Cargo Ships. 
3. Model 
Data collected from this model came from two major model variations, the first of 
which was an initial look at how the model performed and the second of which was a 
refined version that was built with assistance from Ms. Mary McDonald of the Simulation 
Experiment and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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The initial iteration considered the defense of 50 infrastructure nodes, and was 
restricted by a limitation of MANA that did not allow any factor to be set to 0. This caused 
an issue for factors 10 and 11 in Table 22, as one of the desired outcomes was the 
exploration of how the defense responds to individual threats as well as to multiple threats. 
This was important as the Deceptor Cargo Ship was designed to bypass the barrier defenses 
entirely and so it was desirable to be able to analyze the model with and without its 
inclusion.  
This desire notwithstanding, factor 10 and 11 were limited to a minimum of one in 
the first iteration of data collection, limiting analysis to model variations that included all 
three threat types. The design with the updated factors was determined using JMP’s space 
filling Latin Hypercube function applied to the parameters listed in Table 22. This gave us 
33 design points which were then fed into MANA. Each design point was played out 30 
times for a total of 990 iterations in MANA. In order to examine the impact of point defense 
systems on the model, the first set of data was based on area and barrier defense and not 
point defense and therefore did not include factor 8. The second set of data included point 
defense and incorporated all 14 factors. This too was run 990 times. 
In the second iteration, the model was adjusted to incorporate the minimums of 
factors 10 and 11 to the originally desired level of 0. Because of these changes, the number 
of design points was drastically increased, jumping from 33 to 128. We once again 
examined two different scenarios: one included point defense and one did not. The new 
design points were once again run 30 times apiece bringing the total to 3,840 iterations for 
both the point defense and non-point defense versions of the model. In all the second 
iteration of the model included 7,680 individual runs worth of data for follow on analysis. 
In the analysis section to follow, the two data sets will be either described as MANA 
data, meaning 990 runs were conducted per model variation, or SEED data, meaning 3840 
runs were conducted per model variation. 
D. ANALYSIS 
The two measures of effectiveness considered in the analysis is the number of 
pipeline node casualties and the number of enemies killed. The goals of this analysis were 
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to step through and attempt to answer several questions that might be useful to a defense 
planner. This was accomplished via statistical analysis with Excel tables and with the JMP 
statistical package.  
Due to the major emphasis that Gulf Model 1 placed on exploring the decision 
space surrounding the employment of UUV barrier defenses, the first question that Gulf 
Model 2 looked to answer was whether barrier defenses and area patrol assets alone would 
be sufficient to stop or substantially reduce the damage done by attacking UUVs.  
To determine this, we compared the performance of the Barrier/Area Defense 
version of the model to the Point/Barrier/Area Defense version using the SEED data. The 
histograms in Figure 71 and Figure 72 were compiled using the SEED data in JMP and 
illustrate the substantial differences in performance between the two defense systems. In 
total, the 3,840 runs of the Barrier/Area Defense version suffered an average of 19 
casualties per run. In contrast, the Point/Barrier/Area defense version of the model suffered 
an average of 5 casualties per run. Figure 75 and Figure 76 also serve to show that the node 
casualty distributions are not normally distributed around the mean, but rather have long 
trails towards the higher end, underlining the rareness of circumstances in which very large 
number of node casualties are possible. Moreover, they illustrate that over 25% of the 
Point/Barrier/Area Defense design points succeed in achieving two or fewer node 
casualties. The MANA data set produced similar results.  
 
 Barrier/Area Casualties 
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 Point/Barrier/Area Casualties 
Another useful insight for a defense planner would be to categorize a level of risk 
each threat category represents. The enemy asset performance is shown in Table 23, 
utilizing the MANA data set with the Barrier/Area Defense version of the model. Table 23 
shows that the most lethal threat by far is the Deceptor Cargo Ship and its UUV weapons. 
This explains the previous analysis as the barrier defense versions of the model are unable 
to stop Deceptor Cargo Ship from passing the barrier and dropping off their weapons near 
the defenseless infrastructure nodes.  
 
Table 23 Enemy Performance Against Barrier Defense 
Enemy Performance 







Table 24 presents similar results using MANA data for the Point/Barrier/Area 
Defense version. When point defense is included, the Bomber Ships now inflict the most 
damage. The number of successful UUV attacks (either Deceptor or Lone Wolf) drops 
substantially. This is logical, as the point defense weapons will be successful in negating 
much of the effect of the Deceptor UUVs and Lone Wolf UUVs but should have no effect 
on the number of successful Bomber Ship attacks. 
 
128 
Table 24 Enemy Performance against Point/Barrier/Area Defense 
Enemy Performance Average # of nodes destroyed per run (out of 50 nodes)
Bombers 2.2
Lone Wolf UUV 0.2
Deceptor Cargo Ship UUVs 1.5
Total 3.9
 
In assessing the effectiveness of the enemy attacks in the version without point 
defense (Table 25), an average of 3 Bomber Ship destroyed 2.0 nodes, an average of 15.5 
Lone Wolf UUVs destroyed an average of 1.2 nodes, and an average of 9 Cargo Deceptor 
UUVs destroyed an average of 7.9 nodes. Recall that each UUV can destroy up to 4 nodes, 
so Lone Wolf UUVs can destroy up to an average of 62 nodes and Deceptor UUVs can 
destroy up to an average of 36 nodes. The Deceptor UUVs have a higher success rate than 
Lone Wolf UUVs as with no point defense, the only way a Deceptor UUV can be killed is 
via Surface or Air. The success rate drops substantially for both Lone Wolf and Deceptor 
UUVs once point defenses are utilized (Table 24). However, the Deceptor UUV success 
rate is still much higher than the Lone Wolf rate because the Lone Wolf UUVs have to 
successfully navigate through the barrier, unlike the Deceptor UUVs. This further 
illustrates how point defenses have the potential to substantially drive up the cost for the 
attacking forces.  
Another area of interest for a potential decision maker is the analysis of the 
effectiveness of each of the individual units at their disposal with regards to how they might 
be best deployed. Table 25 shows how surface ships are almost equally as effective as 
aircraft at UUV interception while also serving as the sole platform capable of boarding 
and stopping enemy surface ships. While much of this may possibly be attributed to the 
particular design of the aircraft used in the model, it is an important indicator as to the vital 
role that surface ships can perform in a theater wide defense. Note the number of Lone 
Wolf UUVs killed by Surface, Air, and Barrier is identical between the Barrier/Area variant 
and the Point/Barrier/Area variant. 
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Table 25 Average Effectiveness of Blue Assets against Attacker 













Barrier/Area Surface  2.9 2.2  1.7
Air  0 2.5  1.3
Barrier  0 3.7 0
Point/
Barrier/Area 
Surface  2.9 2.2  0.4
Air  0 2.5  0.5
Barrier  0 3.7  0
Pipeline  0 1 6.2
 
Another important observation from Table 25 is that adding point defense did not 
substantially increase the average number of Lone Wolf UUVs killed in each engagement, 
increasing it only from 8.4 to 9.4. Even so, as Table 23 and Table 24 show, adding point 
defense substantially reduces the number of nodes that enemy Lone Wolf UUVs kill on 
average. This underscores the fact that, while potentially a useful tool in deciding Blue 
asset usefulness, kill count is not the most important measure of effectiveness for a 
successful defense. 
Note the total number of UUVs killed in each column of Table 25 is much less than 
the average number of UUVs deployed (displayed at the top of each column). These 
remaining UUVs are still active at the end of the 24-hour time period of the simulation; at 
this point all UUV endurance is assumed to be depleted. Some of these UUVs still active 
are “failures” in that they destroy zero nodes and run out of fuel because their targeting 
ability was either too imprecise or, more often, their travel speed too low to get to a target 
node before running out of fuel. However, some of the active UUVs have destroyed nodes 
and are hunting to destroy more when they run out of fuel. For example on average 3 
Deceptor UUVs are killed in the Barrier/Area variant, leaving on average 6 active at the 
end of the 24 hour period. These 6 have the potential to destroy 24 nodes, but only 7.9 on 
average are destroyed (Table 23). This implies the Attacker has the potential to inflict far 
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greater damage than a superficial examination of Table 23 and Table 24 might reveal. If 
the Attacker has better UUV technology, either in the form of improved endurance, speed, 
or targeting capabilities, the Blue forces would suffer more than losses than presented in 
Table 23 and Table 24. Fortunately, with point defenses there are far fewer active Deceptor 
UUVs at the end of the 24 hour period (1.9), and so less potential for unrealized node 
losses. 
Examination of Table 24 and Table 25 reveals the importance of surface ships to 
defense. Point defense provides an effective subsurface defense against UUVs. However, 
the only way to stop Bomber Ships is via ships. As ships are such an expensive and 
important asset, the decision maker will likely want to know the number of ships required 
in theater in order to effectively accomplish the mission. One way this can be determined 
is by examining the SEED data with the decision tree functionality in JMP. Figure 77 
presents a decision tree splitting on number of Deceptor UUVs deployed by Deceptor 
Cargo ships and number of Blue Ships. The figure is created from the SEED data for the 
point defense version of the model. The tree illustrates how changing the number of ships 
in theater can drastically affect the number of critical nodes lost. The left branch shows that 
when there are less than 12 Deceptor UUVs deployed and when there are four or more 
surface ships in the model, the mean number of node casualties is 3.28, whereas when there 
are less than four surface ships the mean number of node casualties jumps up to 11.12. The 
right branch highlights the importance of surface ships. When 12 or more Deceptor UUVs 
are deployed, on average 8.5 fewer nodes are destroyed in scenarios with 5 or more surface 
ships compared to less than 5 surface ships. This data is validated by the similarly 




 Point/Barrier/Area Defense Decision Tree showing Surface 
Ship Effects 
Another important question for a decision maker concerned with surface ships is 
the relative speed difference between threat ships and Blue ships. As seen in Figure 78, 
utilizing the SEED data tree diagrams helps explore this decision space by illustrating the 
substantial impact that the speed of the threat has on the ability of the threat Bomber Ship 
to successfully conduct an engagement. When the Blue ship, which in the model travels at 
40 kmh, has less than a 5 kmh speed advantage over the enemy ship, the mean number of 
nodes lost is 10.22, as opposed to the mean of 4.62 nodes lost when the speed difference is 
greater than 5 kmh. This is logical as the greater the speed difference, the more likely a 
blue force will be able to engage an attacker, particularly if the geometry of the engagement 
is unfavorable and a chase is involved. This conclusion is further validated by examining 
the next row down, where a speed difference of greater than 24.3kmh results in a mean 
number of nodes lost of 2.67, as opposed to the mean of 5.21 when the speed difference is 
less than 24.3. In practice, helicopters launched from surface ships may improve the speed 
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advantage of surface ships and further increase their importance. It is worth reiterating here 
that the surface ships in the model are looking for ships which they have been notified in 
advance as being potential threats that must be boarded for investigation. If this assumption 
does not hold true, then defense against Bomber Ships will be limited, and surface ships 
will have less of an impact. However, surface ships still play a valuable role in their 
interdiction of subsurface UUV threats even if interdiction of Bomber Ships is not possible 
(see Table 25). In general, a substantial of the enemy threat lies in surface vessels that are 
capable of either destroying infrastructure nodes themselves or delivering UUVs, and the 
functions served by surface ships in this model are absolutely critical to the defense as a 
whole.  
 
 Point/Barrier/Area Defense Decision Tree Showing Speed 
Effects 
One of the primary goals of this study was to explore the decision space so as to be 
able to perform a cost analysis that would help decision makers perform trade-offs when 
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determining where to spend their money when it comes to acquiring assets and improving 
capabilities required for the defense of underwater infrastructure. 
Based on the above analysis, the primary recommendation is that the point defense 
approach be implemented if at all possible. Secondly, there needs to be at least 4 surface 
ships with boarding teams on patrol at all times. Barrier sensor range of 1500m or more 
should be developed if possible, as larger sensor ranges will allow response assets more 
time to reach their targets before they are lost again. Finally, if point defense is utilized, 
the more Blue UUV per point defense position the better. Table 26 shows these minimum 
level force recommendations based on this model. The UUV requirement in Table 26 is 
based on point defense having seven UUV’s each, ships having 15 each, p-8’s having 6 
each, and the barrier UUV stations having 4 each.  
 
Table 26 Force Structure Recommendations 
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VI. COST ESTIMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we perform cost analysis on the four defense scenarios described in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The four scenarios implement different systems and equipment for 
defense of their respective pipelines. The systems and weapons that were investigated for 
the cost analysis were: a sensor field, a SDUUV, a MDUUV, a LDUUX or XLDUUV, 
UUV docking stations, the cost to bury pipes, maritime air patrols, and maritime ship 
patrols. All cost estimates are adjusted to the year 2035 for consistent comparison, refer to 
Table 27. To do this we first convert the data from the year in the original source to FY35 
using the raw index from the navy’s weapons procurement inflation table by using the 
following equation: 
System Cost (FY35) = Raw Data Cost * (FY35 Index / Raw Data Index) 
This analysis also accounted for potential technological advancements that could 
take place in the next 15 years with regards to UUV sensors, speed, and battery life. Table 
27 summarizes the cost estimates for the inputs, and the supporting details appear in the 
following eight sections of this chapter. The Deepwater horizon oil spill serves as an upper 
bound in Table 27 which is the maximum amount a defender would be willing to pay for 
a defense system based on an estimate of the cost to recover from an undefended attack. 
Starting in Section B, we present the specific analysis for each of four scenarios. 
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$1.60 FY15 0.9707 FY35 1.4254 $2.35 
XLDUUV $10.75 FY19 1.0384 FY35 1.4254 $14.76 
MDUUV 
(MK 48) 
$3.80 FY05 0.8091 FY35 1.4254 $6.69 
SDUUV 
(MK 54) 




$295.00 FY15 0.9707 FY35 1.4254 $433.18 
Surface Ship 
(DDG-51) 
$2,234.40 FY10 0.8975 FY35 1.4254 $3,548.62 




$62,000 FY10 0.8975 FY35 1.4254 $98,466.80 
 
B. UUVS 
We associate each UUV technology with a similar current technology based on size 
and speed. This allows us to make reasonable cost estimates based on known quantities. 
For example, UUVs that deploy from a docking station in this report are considered 
MDUUVs, UUVs that carry smaller UUVs are XLDUUV, and the smaller UUVs carried 
by the XLDUUVs are considered small sized UUVs. 
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The MK 54 torpedo represents an estimate of a SDUUV. A MK 54 torpedo is 2.87 
meters in length, has a 0.324 meter diameter, and has a top speed of 83 km/h (Jane’s Naval 
Forces 2001). The MK 48 torpedo represents an estimate for a MDUUV. A MK 48 torpedo 
is 6.1 meters, has a 0.533 meter diameter, and has a top speed of 101 km/h (Jane’s Naval 
Forces 2001). The Boeing Orca UUV represents an estimate of an XLDUUV. The Boeing 
Orca UUV has a length of 15.5 meters, has a 2.1 meter diameter, and a top speed of 14.5 
km/h (Trevithick n.d.). This data is summarized in Table 28 
For each scenario the number of Blue UUVs is multiplied by the estimated cost of 
its associated UUV to derive the total cost. Lastly because the UUVs will have a more 
advanced sensor package than what a torpedo has, a ten percent increase in the cost was 
added to the UUVs compared to the torpedoes as shown in Table 28.  
 
Table 28 Key Parameters for UUVs 
 
Types of UUVs 
SDUUV 
(MK 54 Torpedo) 
MDUUV 
(MK 48 Torpedo) 
XLDUUV 
(Boeing Orca) 
Length (m) 2.87 6.1 15.5 
Diameter (m) 0.324 0.533 2.1 
Speed (km/h) 83 101 14.5 
Weight(lbs) 608 3965 200,000 
Volume (ft3) 9.465 33.25 433.5 
Cost ($M) $0.84 (FY14) $3.8 (FY05) $10.75 (FY19) 
Cost ($M, FY35) $1.25 $6.69 $14.76 
UUV w/ Sensor 
Pkg ($M) 
$1.37 $7.63 $16.23 
 
For the cost of UUVs there is a clear relationship between size and the cost of the 
UUV. The relationship does not appear to be linear but is instead concave, as shown in 
Figure 79 and Figure 80. This may be useful information in future studies to estimate the 
cost of a UUV that is not captured in the three types of categories. 
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 UUV Cost vs Weight for  
 
 UUV Cost vs Volume  
C. SENSOR FIELD 
For the sensor field a different approach is necessary. To estimate sensor field 
requirements in the regions of interest to detect submarines or UUVs broaches the 
classification constraints of this report. Instead, the cost of the sound surveillance system 
(SOSUS) provides an adequate estimate at the unclassified level. The SOSUS in the 
Atlantic would be different from the sensor network employed in the Gulf of Mexico or 












































require different numbers and types of hydrophones. However, SOSUS provides a 
“ballpark estimate” of how much each sensor network will cost and keeps the capstone 
project unclassified. The “ballpark estimate” of the sensor network in 1999 year dollars is 
around $150 million (Pike 1999). 
D. POSEIDON P-8 
One scenario used the Boeing P-8 Poseidon in the defense system. The P-8 will still 
be in use in 2035, therefore we use the current cost of a P-8 then normalize it to the year 
2035. In 2035 P-8’s will cost approximately $295 million in 2015 (Department of Defense 
2014). The normalized values are listed in Table 27. 
E. ARLEIGH BURKE DDG 
Arleigh Burke DDGs are used as the estimates for the surface control vessels. 
Arleigh Burke DDGs will cost approximately $3,549 million in 2035 (O’Rourke 2011). 
DDGs are used in the capstone project because they have undersea warfighting capabilities. 
DDGs are incorporating the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 which will increase their ability to track, 
detect, and find underwater contacts (Keller 2019). There are possible cheaper alternatives, 
such as, Coast Guard National Security Cutters (NSC) or Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
They would have to be retrofitted for undersea warfare and would be less capable than 
DDGs, but they would still likely cost substantially less than a DDG. NSC’s cost on 
average around 670 million per ship (O’Rourke 2019). 
Cost estimation for a DDG is difficult since this project doesn’t anticipate building 
any new DDGs for the Gulf of Mexico or Natuna Besar. However, there will be a cost in 
the loss of a DDG operationally to other parts of the world. At a minimum the operation 
and maintenance costs need to be accounted for if a DDG is used in either theater in 
addition. The estimate for the cost of a DDG is included in Table 27 or consideration but 
is not added to the final total for the group that used it.  
F. BURIED PIPELINE 
Carpet bombing is a plausible attack scenario. The best way to combat this would 
be to bury as much pipe as possible. A buried pipe might also effectively thwart several 
140 
other of the attack scenarios considered in this report. It costs roughly $1.6 million per 
kilometer in 2015 to bury pipe (MarEx 2015). 
G. UNDERWATER DOCKING STATION 
Currently there are not any operational employed underwater docking stations for 
UUVs. Fortunately, the navy contracted Aerojet Rocketdyne to develop an underwater 
docking station (Aerojet Rocketdyne 2017). Since this is a prototype, an 80% learning 
curve was used out to 20 units and then averaged to get an estimate of the cost of a docking 
station as shown in Figure 81(Nussbaum 2018). The final values are not normalized as they 
are future estimates. A learning curve was applied because it is expected that the price per 
unit of the underwater docking station would decrease as familiarity with the 
manufacturing and installation process increased (Wong 2013). 
 
 
 Docking Station Learning Curve 
H. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE  
To avoid classification constraints, the operation and maintenance data is not 
included in estimating the cost of the undersea defense system. It should be noted that this 
























I. COST OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
When is the cost of the defense system too high? The cost of a defense system 
should be less than the cost incurred from an attack on an undefended system. How 
damaging would a successful attack be? A successful attack may look like the Deepwater 
Horizon spill and could potentially cost as much as $62 billion in 2010 (Bomey 2016). A 
successful attack would likely cost at least this much and could be worse if multiple parts 
of the infrastructure are damaged. If the defense system would cost more than the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, it may be more cost effective to simply repair the oil pipelines, 
than to try to defend them.  
J. COST ANALYSIS FOR GULF OF MEXICO  
The cost estimation was conducted by identifying the systems required for each 
defense scenario. The estimated cost for each system that has been discussed in Chapter 5 
are summarized into Table 29 and Table 30, it shows the total cost estimate to construct 
the defense systems for Gulf of Mexico One and Gulf of Mexico Two.  
Table 29 contains an estimate for a point defense system used by Gulf of Mexico 
One, estimated in 2035 year dollars. The total cost minus the sensor field of defense 
infrastructure is $33.01 million, which covers 20 km of the area of operation. The Gulf of 
Mexico One simulated an area of operation is much smaller as compare to Gulf of Mexico 
Two.  
To adequately compare them, we scale the values in Table 30 The simulated area 
of operation for Gulf of Mexico One covers 20 km instead of the proposed 1000 km defense 
layout. Thus, the values from Table 29 will be multiplied by 50 times and the total defense 
infrastructure cost with sensor field will be $1,540.30 million to defend the entire Gulf of 
Mexico. 
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Estimated Cost per System 
(Including Operating Cost) 
($M)
Total Cost  
($M) 
Barrier Defense (3 Ports) (AO: 20 km)
MDUUV  
w/ Sensor 3 $7.63 $30.52 
Docking 
Station 3 $0.83 $2.49 
Total Cost: $33.01 
Barrier Defense (Scaled to Entire Gulf of Mexico) (AO: 1000 km) 
Sensor  
Field 1 $271.00 $271.30 
 MDUUV  
w/ Sensor 
150 $7.63 $1,144.50 
 Docking 
Station 
150 $0.83 $124.50 
Total Cost: $1,540.30 
 
Table 30 presents the cost estimate of a point defense and barrier system. The point 
defense system includes UUVs and docking stations. The barrier system incorporates 
surface ships, aircraft, and a sensor field with affiliated docking stations and UUVs to 
respond, The total cost of the system defense for the Gulf of Mexico Two sum up to 
$6,854.74 million.  
The cost of using surface ships was not included in the total cost because it isn’t 
anticipated that DDGs will be built specifically for the purpose of defending the Gulf. 
However, losing operational DDGs in other regions of the world is an operational cost that 
needs to be considered by the commander. We also do include the O&M cost for surface 
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ships or aircraft in this table, so the final value needs to be inflated by an estimate of those 
costs. 





Estimated Cost per System, 
Including Operating Cost 
($M)
Total Cost  
($M) 
Point Defense (50 Nodes) and Barrier Defense (1265 km) 
Sensor 
Field 1 $271.00 $271.30 
MDUUV  
w/ Sensor 850 $7.63 $6,485.50 
Docking 
Station 
118 0.83 $97.94 
Surface 
Ship 4 O&M cost undisclosed - 
Patrol 
Aircraft 3 O&M cost undisclosed  - 
Total Cost: $6,854.74 
 
Based on the above estimations, it will cost $1.5 billion and $6.8 billion to 
implement the defensive systems proposed by Gulf One and Gulf Two respectively. The 
implementation is more cost effective than not defending them and tending to the cleanup 
and repair requirements after an attack which will cost approximately $98.5 billion in year 
2035. 
K. COST ANALYSIS FOR NATUNA BESAR 
Table 31 and Table 32 present the cost estimates for Natuna Besar One and Natuna 
Besar Two, respectively. 
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From Table 31 presents the total cost for a point defense on a single platform for 
Natuna Besar One. The total defense infrastructure cost will be $66.18 million which 
consists of 3 x XLDUUV with sensor, 12 x SDUUV and 3 x docking station. 
 





Estimated Cost per System 
(Including Operating Cost) 
($M) 
Total Cost ($M) 
Point Defense for 1 Platform 
SDUUV  12 $1.25 $15.00 
XLDUUV 
w/Sensor 
3 $16.23 $48.69 
Docking 
Staion 
3 $0.83 $2.49 
Total Cost: $66.18 
 
From Table 32, the total cost of the system defense for the Gulf Blue sum up to 
$2.2 million which covers 3.2 km of the area of operation. The total cost minus the sensor 
field of defense infrastructure is $8.46 million which cover 3.2 km of the area of operation. 
As the simulated area of operation for Natuna Besar Two covers 3.2 km instead of the 
proposed 640 km defense layout. Thus, the values from Table 32 are multiplied by 200 
times and the total defense infrastructure cost with the sensor field will be $1,963.3 million 
to defense the entire Natuna Besar region pipeline. 
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Estimated Cost per System 
(Including Operating Cost) 
($M) 
Total Cost ($M) 
Barrier Defense (AO: 3.2km) 
MDUUV 
w/ Sensor 
1 $7.63 $7.63 
Docking 
Station 
1 $0.83 $0.83 
Total Cost: $8.46 
Barrier Defense (Scaled) (AO: 640km) 
Sensor  
Field 
1 $271.00 $271.30 
MDUUV 
w/ Sensor 
200 $7.63 $1,526.00 
Docking 
Station 
200 $0.83 $166.00 
Total Cost: $1,963.30 
 
Based on above estimations, it will cost $13.5 billion for Natuna Besar One to 
implement a point defense system to safeguard 152 oil and gas platforms within the region. 
As for Natuna Besar Two, it will cost $2 billion to install a barrier defense system to cover 
the 640 km of pipeline. Similarly, the implementation is more cost effective then not 
defending and performing cleanup and repair after an attack. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The project team recognized that in order to design a manned and unmanned system 
capable of providing seabed infrastructure defense against a multitude of threats, future 
designers will first require insights into various aspects of the problem. These insights will 
need to explore the problem space ranging from individual engagements at the tactical level 
to macro level trends which will help guide theater level defense.  
Through a tailored research approach the team focused on identifying desirable 
systems and operational tactics to support undersea infrastructure defense. This suggested 
the development of multiple simulation models for Natuna Besar and the Gulf of Mexico. 
The models simulate both small scale and integrated full-scale wide area operations. 
Despite the differences in design there are a couple of key insights that hold true across the 
four different models that should inform the CONOPS and system design used to defend 
undersea infrastructure. The proposed designs are cost effective when compared to the 
economic impact from a successful attack.  
A. MAJOR INSIGHTS 
1. CONOP Design 
A simple point defense of critical assets is more effective than any barrier defense 
implementations on their own, a finding which was consistent across each of the modeling 
efforts. This is because none of the barrier defenses examined proved to be impregnable to 
the full range of underwater threat capabilities. Whether a barrier is added or not, the 
defensive system should be made up of a networked acoustic sensor array communicating 
with interceptor UUVs launching from fixed docking stations. Roving patrols do not 
provide any benefit as long as the sensor network is able to adequately cover the region. 
The sensor array should be built two or preferably three rows deep in order to provide the 
defending UUVs the most time to engage the threat. Additionally, this system is not 
intended to replace all traditional maritime and coastal defenses. The defense of undersea 
infrastructure has the highest success rate when existing surface and air assets are able to 
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receive information from the sensor array and provide additional firepower to the 
defending UUVs.  
2. System Design 
The most important factor in system design is minimizing the time required to 
engage and effectively neutralize the threat. Speed of the intercepting UUVs is important, 
but time to engage can also be reduced by having more docking stations and reducing the 
distance between them. Continuous targeting updates to the UUVs from a fixed sensor 
array as well as sufficient firepower to disable the threat with one weapon ensures that 
timely engagements result in mission success. 
B. DETAILED INSIGHTS 
1. Natuna Besar Model One (NB1) 
NB1 focused on the best way to employ defensive UUVs in a point defense against 
offensive UUVs. It investigates a CONOP in which the enemy utilizes a diversion tactic 
with some of its forces to draw away the defenders and leave the infrastructure vulnerable 
to an attack by the main enemy force. This tactic allows the enemy to have the highest 
probability of destroying the oil platform with the least number of attacking UUVs.  
For defender UUV employment, two different defensive configurations are 
examined. One of these configurations is a true point defense, in which the defenders are 
concentrated within close proximity of the defended assets. The other configuration 
employs the defensive UUV in a patrol around the defended target. In both simulation 
models, the only defense assets deployed are UUVs, equipped with the capability to 
conduct defensive sensing and mitigation of incoming threats.  
The simulation results conclude that the point defense CONOPS is more effective 
than conducting a perimeter patrol. The patrolling model would need to defend a larger 
area, and even though that area is relatively small, the defense forces were spread too thin. 
As a result, a concentrated enemy attack of even moderate size will easily overwhelm the 
few defenders close enough to respond in time.  
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Detailed analysis of the model focused on identification of desirable system 
characteristics. This analysis concluded that firepower is the most decisive factor for the 
defenders to achieve victory in the model, wherein firepower is a quantifiable metric 
calculated  by assessing the numbers and quality of the attacking and defending forces (see 
page 79). When partitioning design points into high and low scenarios, the high firepower 
scenarios generate a success probability of 0.88, while the low firepower scenarios have a 
success probability of only 0.19. The importance of firepower on mission success suggests 
initial investment for development of a point defense system should focus on creating 
highly accurate weapons that can consistently neutralize the threat every time the UUV is 
employed. 
2. Natuna Besar Model Two (NB2)  
NB2 was composed of three distinct simulations which provided insights for the 
composition of a defense system along the Natuna gas pipeline. The first scenario modeled 
the use of underwater docking stations that were fixed to certain points on a defensive 
barrier and that released their defending UUV when attackers were detected by 
supplemental detection sensors. The second scenario modeled the use of patrolling 
defensive UUVs, which have organic targeting systems onboard and do not need inputs 
from the sensor fields. The third scenario modeled the use of both types of defenders.  
Based on the overall results from the three simulations, it is not recommended to 
deploy a combination of fixed shooters and patrolling shooters in immediate vicinity of the 
pipeline. If the fixed shooters are capable of neutralizing attacking UUV, then the fixed 
shooters alone are sufficient to defend against enemy attacks; adding patrolling shooters 
provides little benefit at increased cost. Also, if the fixed shooters are not capable of 
destroying the attacking units, the few available patrolling units are insufficient to make up 
for this deficiency and the enemy attack will succeed. As such, it would be more cost 
effective to just deploy fixed interceptor UUVs.  
The best way to employ the two defending UUV types together would be to deploy 
them as two entirely separate layers of defense. The patrolling UUV could deploy beyond 
the wired-guided fixed shooter defense range, so that the patrollers perform a separate role 
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of early elimination of threats. The fixed shooter can only engage targets close to the pods 
near the pipe due to its guide wire length limitation.  
Analysis of the first simulation showed that the probability of success is largely 
dependent on the speed difference between the defending UUV from the docking station 
and the adversary UUV. Depending on the speed difference, the distance between each 
docking station can be determined based on the insights from the simulation results. This 
suggests that investments into increasing the speed of the defending UUV decreases the 
required number of docking stations. 
3. Gulf of Mexico Model One (GM1) 
GM1 examined the use of sensor fields to localize a threat UUV and to guide the 
defending UUV through to a successful interception. The primary insight gleaned by this 
model is that the ability to track is more important than having a sophisticated sensor with 
a high probability of detection. That is, as long as a threat UUV remains in the sensor field, 
a less sophisticated sensor with a low probability of detection will still detect, track, and 
maneuver the friendly UUV to interdict the threat UUV. Given the technical challenges 
associated with delaying a threat UUV to ensure that it spends additional time in a sensor 
field, this suggests that any system will necessarily employ multiple layers (or rows) of 
sensors to increase the opportunities to track threat UUVs. However, adding more than 
three rows of sensors provided diminishing returns in comparison to having more 
defending UUV positioned closer together and capable of achieving higher speeds.  
Another important insight generated by this model is that a larger density of 
defender UUVs over a given area is important because it helps decrease the interdiction 
time. Having one friendly UUV cover a large area is not feasible in trying to achieve a high 
probability of kill as even a fast defending UUV may not be able to achieve an interception 
before the enemy UUV has left the sensor field. Any system design must consider the 
expected speed of enemy UUVs in order to determine the required interdiction time and 
employ defending UUV of high enough speed and enough number to meet that time. 
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4. Gulf of Mexico Two 
The single most important observation from the GM2 model is derived from the 
analysis done in forming the assumptions upon which the model was built; without 
actionable intelligence to identify critical contacts of interest, and the legal authority to stop 
and board those shipping vessels, it is nearly impossible to stop those vessels from 
destroying undersea infrastructure. Either directly through the use of their anchors or 
onboard weapons, or indirectly by releasing target-seeking UUV within close proximity of 
their targets, they will be able to accomplish their mission.  
Allowing for the assumption that those criteria have been met, the GM2 model 
underlines the issue that a barrier defense of undersea sensors and UUV alone, or even in 
conjunction with area defense patrols, is insufficient. Not only did adding point defense 
weaponry and sensors at critical nodes more than halve the average number of enemy 
successes, it also limited enemy successes to fewer than 2 on 25% of the runs modeled, as 
opposed to the mere .5% of the time where that was achieved without point defense. This 
suggests that if at all possible, point defense must be allocated to critical infrastructure. 
Additionally, the model showed that increasing ammunition available for point defense 
units was more important than increasing it for any other unit class. This is because the 
aircraft and ships only rarely conducted enough interdictions to utilize even the lower level 
ammunition allotments modeled. 
Besides point defense, the next most important observations from GM2 have to do 
with the functions served by defending surface ships in the model. Since enemy ships and 
ship-borne UUVs pose the greatest threat, fielding defensive assets capable of stopping 
them is of the highest priority. One way the model shows this can be done is by ensuring 
that the defending assets have the speed necessary to rapidly close and board with the 
threat. In the model, this is shown by examining the speed difference between defender 
and enemy ships. In practice, this could be greatly amplified by ensuring that defending 
ships have helicopter based boarding teams that could respond even faster. Moreover, 
giving those helicopters the ability to carry counter UUV weapons would further enable 
ships near underwater sensor fields the ability to kill high speed attacking UUVs.  
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Maritime patrol aircraft were of limited utility in the model due to fact they don’t 
have persistent organic subsurface sensors and they lacked the speed and numbers to 
reliably get on sight and make interdictions when targets were communicated to them by 
other sensing platforms. This is in large part also due to the relatively small size of the 
sensor fields compared to the Gulf of Mexico at large; sensors with more depth or layered 
in wider arrays would give response aircraft more time to threats before they passed the 
sensor coverage area. Aircraft tactics and operations are also important in this regard, as 
aircraft patrols assigned solely to patrolling the barrier should put them in a better position 
to respond to threats while within range of the barrier sensors.  
5. Cost Analysis 
The cost analysis team calculated a minimum total cost estimate for each defense 
group. Operation and maintenance costs could not be included due to data sensitivity in 
some areas and a lack of available data in others, but it is worth observing that major 
acquisitions projects can often face operations and maintenance costs between 80% and 
95% of total life cycle cost (Josiah, 2002).  The following values are expressed in 2035 
year dollars. The cost of the barrier defense simulated by Gulf of Mexico Model One scaled 
to the required size for the Gulf of Mexico would cost $1.5 billion. The combination of a 
point defense and a more capable barrier defense utilized in Gulf of Mexico Model Two 
would cost at least $6.8 billion, excluding the cost for the surface ships and patrol aircrafts. 
On the high end, assuming that operations and maintenance cost form roughly 95% of the 
total life cycle cost of this system, the implementation of these defensive systems can be 
estimated to cost approximately $27.4 billion and $130.2 billion respectively. In contrast, 
a single successful attack on the Gulf of Mexico oil pipelines could mirror the nearly $100 
billion recovery cost of an attack which causes a Deepwater Horizon type spill. The cost 
effectiveness of implementing a defense system in the Gulf of Mexico is dependent on 
these estimations and the likelihood and expected frequency of an attack. Since underwater 
infrastructure attacks are a newly emerging threat class, they fit the “Black Swan Event” 
category of possible events of incalculable probability of occurrence. Even so, at slightly 
higher than half the cost of a single attack with Deepwater Horizon level consequences, 
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this investment is potentially viable depending on how seriously decision makers take the 
threat.  
The barrier defense simulated by Natuna Besar Two scaled to a 640 km which is 
the total pipeline length for Natuna Besar, and this would cost $1.9 billion. The point 
defense simulated by Natuna Besar Gold to defend a single platform was $66 million. 
However, there are approximately 152 oil platforms in the Natuna Besar region, so the 
scaled total cost will be $10 billion. Once again assuming a 95% operations and 
maintenance cost, these defensive schemes quickly balloon to $36 billion and $190 billion 
respectively. At an 80% operating and maintenance costs, these numbers reach a more 
tangible but still enormous $7.6 billion and $40 billion respectively. Both of the estimated 
costs for the Natuna Besar region are below the estimated cost of a successful attack in the 
context of recovering from a Deepwater Horizon level environmental disaster, but it is 
unclear whether regional governments will weigh that risk in the same way that U.S. 
decision makers might, particularly considering the substantially smaller defense budgets 
at their disposal.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implementing a defensive system responsible for protecting underwater 
infrastructure defense of the Natuna Besar or Gulf of Mexico regions is a proposition of 
breathtaking proportions. It would require significant amounts of capital for both the initial 
design of and deployment of the defensive systems in the short term and for the 
administration, maintenance, and eventual replacement of those systems over the ensuing 
decades. Before pushing ahead with any such projects in a piecemeal fashion, high level 
decision makers should take several factors into consideration.  
First, while there is substantial appeal in investing in active defenses such as those 
investigated in this paper, due to the optimism generally associated with new technologies 
and the potential applications they may have towards unforeseen uses, equal attention 
should be paid towards passive defensive measures, resilient and redundant systems, and 
repair and recovery capabilities. As the saying goes, with high value targets the defender 
needs to be successful every time, but the attacker only needs to be lucky once. Ultimately, 
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efforts to discourage attacks, mitigate the damage from attacks when they happen, and 
recover from them as quickly as possible may be more valuable in the long run than any 
active defense.  
Second, if active defenses are developed and deployed, it is critical that a thorough 
systems engineering process guides that effort. The decades’ long nature of such an 
enterprise, the enormous number of shareholders, the enormity of the technical challenges, 
the evolving nature of the threat, and the massive amounts of capital required to tackle 
every major aspect of the problem demand it. Without thorough systems engineering 
efforts to gain insights into potential issues faced by the enterprise developers and head 
them off before they raise their heads, enterprise level defense of underwater infrastructure 
is bound to be railed by cost overruns, incompatible systems, and substandard performance. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
In the event that decision makers decide to invest in an active defense system to 
protect underwater infrastructure, the following observations from each respective model 
provide some direction into further research that should be done prior to commencing such 
a project.  
1. Diversionary Tactics 
One important finding for this project had to do with the general effectiveness of 
diversionary tactics for the attacking UUV. Further research should be done into making 
autonomous systems intelligent enough to avoid being drawn away by a diversion tactic. 
2. Underwater Communication 
The proposed communication systems rely on current technologies such as fiber or 
copper wire for UUV guidance systems. Increased accuracy for the intercepting UUV 
could be attained with future research into underwater communication systems. An 
analysis of alternatives should be performed to determine the best way of networking the 
UUVs. 
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3. Detect to Engage 
The models for barrier defense focused on two functions—detecting and 
intercepting underwater vehicles coming through the barrier. It did so by investigating a 
single alternative for each function; sensors for detection and underwater docking stations 
which launched defender UUV for the interception. For future work, alternative designs 
should be investigated for performing the detection and interception functions. For 
detection, permanent or semi-permanent underwater sensors should be investigated for 
their ability to sense enemy UUVs attempting to pass the barrier. For interception, airborne 
drones capable of maintaining station over a yet-to-be-determined portion of the barrier 
and dropping interceptors directly above enemy UUV would be an ideal candidate to 
decrease intercept time. Each alternative should be evaluated for technical feasibility and 
performance against a wide range of threats. 
4. Vulnerability Assessment 
In order to accomplish point defense of critical and critically vulnerable 
infrastructure, it is imperative that research is done on identifying which infrastructure 
nodes meet that definition. This is a tricky proposition for several reasons. First, it requires 
expert knowledge on infrastructure systems, particularly with respect to their 
vulnerabilities and the roles they play within their respective enterprises. With respect to 
their vulnerabilities and the roles they play within their respective enterprises. Second, 
conducting that research, amassing that data, and acting on it by implementing point 
defense solutions is problematic in and of itself in that in the wrong hands that information 
could help an enemy plan their attack far more effectively than they would have otherwise 
been able. 
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APPENDIX A – UUV SPECIFICATIONS 
A. REMUS 100  
 
 
 “Remus 100” UUV. Source: Buton (2009) 
 
Table 33 Remus 100 Specifications 
Weight 37 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 8-22 hours 
Speed 1-10 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 100m 
Sensors RD1 1.2 MHz up/down-looking 
Doppler Current Profiler/ Doppler 
Velocity Log; Marine Sonics 




B. BLUEFIN 9 
Table 34 Bluefin 9 Specifications 
Weight 50 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 12 hours 
Speed 3.6-10 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 100 m 
Sensors  
 
C. BLUEFIN 12—LATER MODEL OF BLUEFIN 9 
 
 
 Bluefin 12S, Courtesy of General Dynamics  
 
Table 35 Bluefin 12 Specifications 
Weight 50 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 10-23 hours 
Speed 3.6-10 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 200 m 








D. BLUEFIN 21 
 
Table 36 Bluefin 21 Specifications 
Weight 750 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 25 hours 
Speed 8 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 4500 m 
Sensors 455-kHz side-scan sonar 
 
1. Remus-600—equipped with SSAM sonar that enable Remus-600 to detect mines 
on the seabed or partially buried and in service in the Royal Navy (Kongsverg 
2019). 
Table 37 Remus-600 Spec 
Weight 240 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 70 hours 
Speed 10 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 600 m 
Sensors Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler; 
side-scan sonar; CTD. Dual-frequency 
side-scan sonar 
 
2. Remus-3000 (Kongsverg 2019). 
Table 38  Remus-3000 Spec 
Weight 345 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 77 hours 
Speed 7 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 3000 m 
Sensors Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler; 




3. Hugin—a family of UUV developed in Norway by Kongsberg 
 
 
 HUGIN UUV. Source: Kongsverg (2019) 
 
 
Table 39 HUGIN Spec 
Weight 100-1500 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 24-74 hours 
Speed 4-11  kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 3000-6000 m 




4. AQUA EXPLORER 2—UUV used for underwater cable inspection (Proceedings, 
2000).  
 
 AE2. Source: Proceedings (2000) 
 
Table 40 AQUA EXPLORER 2 Spec 
Weight 300 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance 24-74 hours 
Speed 5-10  kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight - 
Depth 2000 m 








5. Theseus—Canadian UAV used for laying underwater cables  
 
 Theseus UUV. Source: ISE (2019) 
 
Table 41 Theseus Spec 
Weight 8600 Kg 
Range >1600 
Endurance 168 hours 
Speed 7.5  kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight 1910 Kg 





6. “Spray Glider”—Gliding UUV  
 
 Spray Glider UUV. Source: Davis, Eriksen, Jones, and 
Clayton (2002) 
Table 42 Spray Glider Spec 
Weight 51 Kg 
Range 7000 km 
Endurance 8000 hours 
Speed 1kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 






7. “Seaglider”—glider UUV developed by University of Washington, was used to 




 Seaglider UUV, Courtesy of University of Washington 
Table 43 Seaglider Spec 
Weight 52 Kg 
Range 4600km 
Endurance - 
Speed 1 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight 25 Kg 




8. “Deepglider”—developed from “seaglider”  
 
 
 “Deepglider” UUV. Source: Osse and Eriksen (2007) 
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Table 44 Deepglider Spec 
Weight 62 Kg 
Range 8500 km 
Endurance - 
Speed 1 kph 
Propulsion  Electrical engine 
Payload weight 25 Kg 









 “Panther XT” ROV. Source: SaabSeaeye (2019) 
 
Table 45 Panther-XT Spec 
Weight 500 Kg 
Range - 
Endurance - 
Speed 5.5 kph 
Propulsion  - 
Payload weight 110 Kg 
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APPENDIX B – TORPEDO SPECIFICATIONS 
A. MK-48: AMERICAN HEAVYWEIGHT TORPEDO, IN SERVICE FROM 
1972. (PETTY, 2019) 
Table 46 MK-48 Spec 
Weight 1500 Kg 
Range >8 km 
Endurance - 
Speed >51.2 kph 
Propulsion  Piston engine 




B. SHKVAL – RUSSIAN TORPEDO (RUSSIA, 1995), (TYLER, 2000) 
 






Table 47 Shkval Spec 
Weight 2700 Kg 
Range ~10 km 
Endurance - 
Speed >370 kph 
Propulsion  Piston engine 
Warhead weight - 
Depth - 
 
1. SAAB future torpedo—Turped 47: SAAB corporation is a manufacture of 
torpedoes such as Turped 45 and are currently developing the next generation and 
published the general specifications of the future Torpedo (Saab, 2017). 
Table 48 Turped 47 Spec 
Weight 340 Kg 
Range 10 km 
Endurance - 
Speed 74 kph 
Propulsion  - 
Warhead weight - 
Depth 300 m 
  
2. “Spearfish” is a heavyweight torpedo, in service for the royal navy since 1992 
(Spearfish, 2017). 
 
Table 49 Spearfish Spec 
Weight 1850 Kg 
Range 50 km 
Endurance - 
Speed 150 kph 
Propulsion  Gas turbine 












3. “F21” French heavyweight torpedo (DCNS, 2019). 
 
Table 50 F21 Spec 
Weight 1500 Kg 
Range 50 km 
Endurance - 
Speed 92 kph 
Propulsion  Electric engine 




4. “MK54”—lightweight torpedo developed by “Raytheon” and in use by the U.S. 
Navy (Petty, 2019).  
Table 51 MK54 Spec 




Propulsion  liquid propellant 
Warhead weight 44 Kg 




5. “MU90”—lightweight torpedo, In service with France, Italy, Germany, Denmark 
Poland (MU90, 2019). 
 
Table 52 M90 Spec 
Weight 304 Kg 
Range >10 Km 
Endurance - 
Speed >92 kph  
Propulsion  liquid propellant 
Warhead weight - 
Depth >1000 m 
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C. SAAB FUTURE TORPEDO 
Turped 47: SAAB corporation is a manufacture of torpedoes such as Turped 45 and 
are currently developing the next generation and published the general specifications of the 
future Torpedo (Saab, 2017). 
Table 53 Turped 47 Spec 
Weight 340 Kg 
Range 10 km 
Endurance - 
Speed 74 kph 
Propulsion  - 
Warhead weight - 
Depth 300 m 
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APPENDIX C – “UNDERWATER CARPET BOMBING” 
SCENARIO – HIT PROBABILITY CALCULATION 
 
1. Enemy vessel (disguised as commercial vessel) sailing along a pipeline and 
dropping munition : 
 
 
X-axis : pipeline direction 
Y-axis : perpendicular to X , on seabed plane 
Z-axis : Depth 
 
2. Assumptions : 
a. Depth : 50–1500 m (Gulf Coast, 2019) 
b. Error in ship in Y-axis (error from being directly above pipeline) < 5m 
(simple commercial GPS accuracy, probably can be much better) 
∆𝑦 5𝑚 
c. Current average speed : 0.1-0.2 m/sec 
𝑉 0.2 𝑚/𝑠𝑒𝑐 
 
d. Munition Weight : 500Kg 
e. Munition content : TNT  

















h. Kill distance—most tricky to estimate., obviously depend on how deep the 
pipe is burried, anc no model for sea-bed penetration found. Using [33] we 
can see that a 500kg TNT bomb can have significant Impact up to 90 
charge radii or in our case 36m. creating more than 25m of high-pressure 
gas bubble. The report has only data up to 100ft but we can see that the 
impact increases with depth so usually in our scenario the impact will 
increase.  
i. From Sulfredge 2019 we can get the data of the impact to different 
underwater structures but not to pipes or buried pipes. We can maybe use 
the tables showing the impulse generated in different depths and distances 
to estimate the distance that will cause damage to pipes.  
 
3. Calculations : 
a. Time to bottom = t 





Where 𝑚  is munition mass and 𝑚  is the water mass being pushed by 
munition 
c. 𝑚  is the water mas of the munition volume : 
𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 1000 ∗ 0.3 300𝑘𝑔 
(using water density 1000 kg/m^3) 




















27.3 𝑠𝑒𝑐  
 
f. Now we can calculate the drift cause by the currents , assuming the current 
speed is constant: 
∆𝑦  𝑉 𝑡 0.2 ∗ 27.3 ≅ 5.5𝑚 
g. If we consider the ship navigation error in the worst case, we get to a total 
miss distance of 10m.  
h. Since miss distance is much smaller than the estimated kill distance  
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